20 files changed, 130 insertions, 119 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 4474bf32d0a4..928820e61cb5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ config X86
 	select ACPI_HOTPLUG_CPU			if ACPI_PROCESSOR && HOTPLUG_CPU
 	select ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T			if X86_32
 	select ARCH_CLOCKSOURCE_INIT
+	select ARCH_CONFIGURES_CPU_MITIGATIONS
 	select ARCH_CORRECT_STACKTRACE_ON_KRETPROBE
 	select ARCH_ENABLE_HUGEPAGE_MIGRATION if X86_64 && HUGETLB_PAGE && MIGRATION
 	select ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTPLUG if X86_64
@@ -2488,17 +2489,21 @@ config PREFIX_SYMBOLS
 	def_bool y
 	depends on CALL_PADDING && !CFI_CLANG
 
-menuconfig SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS
-	bool "Mitigations for speculative execution vulnerabilities"
+menuconfig CPU_MITIGATIONS
+	bool "Mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities"
 	default y
 	help
-	  Say Y here to enable options which enable mitigations for
-	  speculative execution hardware vulnerabilities.
+	  Say Y here to enable options which enable mitigations for hardware
+	  vulnerabilities (usually related to speculative execution).
+	  Mitigations can be disabled or restricted to SMT systems at runtime
+	  via the "mitigations" kernel parameter.
 
-	  If you say N, all mitigations will be disabled. You really
-	  should know what you are doing to say so.
+	  If you say N, all mitigations will be disabled.  This CANNOT be
+	  overridden at runtime.
 
-if SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS
+	  Say 'Y', unless you really know what you are doing.
+
+if CPU_MITIGATIONS
 
 config MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 	bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode"
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
index a3c0df11d0e6..2fb7d53cf333 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
@@ -98,11 +98,6 @@ static int addr_to_vsyscall_nr(unsigned long addr)
 
 static bool write_ok_or_segv(unsigned long ptr, size_t size)
 {
-	/*
-	 * XXX: if access_ok, get_user, and put_user handled
-	 * sig_on_uaccess_err, this could go away.
-	 */
-
 	if (!access_ok((void __user *)ptr, size)) {
 		struct thread_struct *thread = &current->thread;
 
@@ -120,10 +115,8 @@ static bool write_ok_or_segv(unsigned long ptr, size_t size)
 bool emulate_vsyscall(unsigned long error_code,
 		      struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
 {
-	struct task_struct *tsk;
 	unsigned long caller;
 	int vsyscall_nr, syscall_nr, tmp;
-	int prev_sig_on_uaccess_err;
 	long ret;
 	unsigned long orig_dx;
 
@@ -172,8 +165,6 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(unsigned long error_code,
 		goto sigsegv;
 	}
 
-	tsk = current;
-
 	/*
 	 * Check for access_ok violations and find the syscall nr.
 	 *
@@ -234,12 +225,8 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(unsigned long error_code,
 		goto do_ret;  /* skip requested */
 
 	/*
-	 * With a real vsyscall, page faults cause SIGSEGV.  We want to
-	 * preserve that behavior to make writing exploits harder.
+	 * With a real vsyscall, page faults cause SIGSEGV.
 	 */
-	prev_sig_on_uaccess_err = current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err;
-	current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err = 1;
-
 	ret = -EFAULT;
 	switch (vsyscall_nr) {
 	case 0:
@@ -262,23 +249,12 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(unsigned long error_code,
 		break;
 	}
 
-	current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err = prev_sig_on_uaccess_err;
-
 check_fault:
 	if (ret == -EFAULT) {
 		/* Bad news -- userspace fed a bad pointer to a vsyscall. */
 		warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_INFO, regs,
 				  "vsyscall fault (exploit attempt?)");
-
-		/*
-		 * If we failed to generate a signal for any reason,
-		 * generate one here.  (This should be impossible.)
-		 */
-		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sigismember(&tsk->pending.signal, SIGBUS) &&
-				 !sigismember(&tsk->pending.signal, SIGSEGV)))
-			goto sigsegv;
-
-		return true;  /* Don't emulate the ret. */
+		goto sigsegv;
 	}
 
 	regs->ax = ret;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h
index c086699b0d0c..aa6c8f8ca958 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ u64 cc_mkdec(u64 val);
 void cc_random_init(void);
 #else
 #define cc_vendor (CC_VENDOR_NONE)
+static const u64 cc_mask = 0;
 
 static inline u64 cc_mkenc(u64 val)
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/e820/api.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/e820/api.h
index e8f58ddd06d9..2e74a7f0e935 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/e820/api.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/e820/api.h
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ extern bool e820__mapped_all(u64 start, u64 end, enum e820_type type);
 extern void e820__range_add   (u64 start, u64 size, enum e820_type type);
 extern u64  e820__range_update(u64 start, u64 size, enum e820_type old_type, enum e820_type new_type);
 extern u64  e820__range_remove(u64 start, u64 size, enum e820_type old_type, bool check_type);
+extern u64  e820__range_update_table(struct e820_table *t, u64 start, u64 size, enum e820_type old_type, enum e820_type new_type);
 
 extern void e820__print_table(char *who);
 extern int  e820__update_table(struct e820_table *table);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
index 0b748ee16b3d..9abb8cc4cd47 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@
 #define _COMMON_PAGE_CHG_MASK	(PTE_PFN_MASK | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PWT |	\
 				 _PAGE_SPECIAL | _PAGE_ACCESSED |	\
 				 _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY |	\
-				 _PAGE_DEVMAP | _PAGE_ENC | _PAGE_UFFD_WP)
+				 _PAGE_DEVMAP | _PAGE_CC | _PAGE_UFFD_WP)
 #define _PAGE_CHG_MASK	(_COMMON_PAGE_CHG_MASK | _PAGE_PAT)
 #define _HPAGE_CHG_MASK (_COMMON_PAGE_CHG_MASK | _PAGE_PSE | _PAGE_PAT_LARGE)
 
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ enum page_cache_mode {
 };
 #endif
 
+#define _PAGE_CC		(_AT(pteval_t, cc_mask))
 #define _PAGE_ENC		(_AT(pteval_t, sme_me_mask))
 
 #define _PAGE_CACHE_MASK	(_PAGE_PWT | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PAT)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 811548f131f4..78e51b0d6433 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -472,7 +472,6 @@ struct thread_struct {
 	unsigned long		iopl_emul;
 
 	unsigned int		iopl_warn:1;
-	unsigned int		sig_on_uaccess_err:1;
 
 	/*
 	 * Protection Keys Register for Userspace.  Loaded immediately on
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 7f57382afee4..93ed60080cfe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ int rmp_make_private(u64 pfn, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, u32 asid, bool immut
 int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level);
 void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages);
 void kdump_sev_callback(void);
+void snp_fixup_e820_tables(void);
 #else
 static inline bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void) { return false; }
 static inline int snp_lookup_rmpentry(u64 pfn, bool *assigned, int *level) { return -ENODEV; }
@@ -282,6 +283,7 @@ static inline int rmp_make_private(u64 pfn, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, u32 as
 static inline int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level) { return -ENODEV; }
 static inline void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages) {}
 static inline void kdump_sev_callback(void) { }
+static inline void snp_fixup_e820_tables(void) {}
 #endif
 
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sparsemem.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sparsemem.h
index 1be13b2dfe8b..64df897c0ee3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sparsemem.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sparsemem.h
@@ -37,8 +37,6 @@ extern int phys_to_target_node(phys_addr_t start);
 #define phys_to_target_node phys_to_target_node
 extern int memory_add_physaddr_to_nid(u64 start);
 #define memory_add_physaddr_to_nid memory_add_physaddr_to_nid
-extern int numa_fill_memblks(u64 start, u64 end);
-#define numa_fill_memblks numa_fill_memblks
 #endif
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
index c342c4aa9c68..803dcfb0e346 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c
@@ -1771,7 +1771,7 @@ void x2apic_setup(void)
 	__x2apic_enable();
 }
 
-static __init void apic_set_fixmap(void);
+static __init void apic_set_fixmap(bool read_apic);
 
 static __init void x2apic_disable(void)
 {
@@ -1793,7 +1793,12 @@ static __init void x2apic_disable(void)
 	}
 
 	__x2apic_disable();
-	apic_set_fixmap();
+	/*
+	 * Don't reread the APIC ID as it was already done from
+	 * check_x2apic() and the APIC driver still is a x2APIC variant,
+	 * which fails to do the read after x2APIC was disabled.
+	 */
+	apic_set_fixmap(false);
 }
 
 static __init void x2apic_enable(void)
@@ -2057,13 +2062,14 @@ void __init init_apic_mappings(void)
 	}
 }
 
-static __init void apic_set_fixmap(void)
+static __init void apic_set_fixmap(bool read_apic)
 {
 	set_fixmap_nocache(FIX_APIC_BASE, mp_lapic_addr);
 	apic_mmio_base = APIC_BASE;
 	apic_printk(APIC_VERBOSE, "mapped APIC to %16lx (%16lx)\n",
 		    apic_mmio_base, mp_lapic_addr);
-	apic_read_boot_cpu_id(false);
+	if (read_apic)
+		apic_read_boot_cpu_id(false);
 }
 
 void __init register_lapic_address(unsigned long address)
@@ -2073,7 +2079,7 @@ void __init register_lapic_address(unsigned long address)
 	mp_lapic_addr = address;
 
 	if (!x2apic_mode)
-		apic_set_fixmap();
+		apic_set_fixmap(true);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index cb9eece55904..307302af0aee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -459,8 +459,7 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 	case 0x1a:
 		switch (c->x86_model) {
-		case 0x00 ... 0x0f:
-		case 0x20 ... 0x2f:
+		case 0x00 ... 0x2f:
 		case 0x40 ... 0x4f:
 		case 0x70 ... 0x7f:
 			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ZEN5);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c b/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c
index 6f1b379e3b38..68b09f718f10 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c
@@ -532,9 +532,10 @@ u64 __init e820__range_update(u64 start, u64 size, enum e820_type old_type, enum
 	return __e820__range_update(e820_table, start, size, old_type, new_type);
 }
 
-static u64 __init e820__range_update_kexec(u64 start, u64 size, enum e820_type old_type, enum e820_type  new_type)
+u64 __init e820__range_update_table(struct e820_table *t, u64 start, u64 size,
+				    enum e820_type old_type, enum e820_type new_type)
 {
-	return __e820__range_update(e820_table_kexec, start, size, old_type, new_type);
+	return __e820__range_update(t, start, size, old_type, new_type);
 }
 
 /* Remove a range of memory from the E820 table: */
@@ -806,7 +807,7 @@ u64 __init e820__memblock_alloc_reserved(u64 size, u64 align)
 
 	addr = memblock_phys_alloc(size, align);
 	if (addr) {
-		e820__range_update_kexec(addr, size, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED);
+		e820__range_update_table(e820_table_kexec, addr, size, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED);
 		pr_info("update e820_table_kexec for e820__memblock_alloc_reserved()\n");
 		e820__update_table_kexec();
 	}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index 7062b84dd467..6d3d20e3e43a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ void __show_regs(struct pt_regs *regs, enum show_regs_mode mode,
 		       log_lvl, d3, d6, d7);
 	}
 
-	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
+	if (cr4 & X86_CR4_PKE)
 		printk("%sPKRU: %08x\n", log_lvl, read_pkru());
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
index 8b04958da5e7..b4f8fa0f722c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
@@ -1203,12 +1203,14 @@ static enum es_result vc_check_opcode_bytes(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
 		break;
 
 	case SVM_EXIT_MONITOR:
-		if (opcode == 0x010f && modrm == 0xc8)
+		/* MONITOR and MONITORX instructions generate the same error code */
+		if (opcode == 0x010f && (modrm == 0xc8 || modrm == 0xfa))
 			return ES_OK;
 		break;
 
 	case SVM_EXIT_MWAIT:
-		if (opcode == 0x010f && modrm == 0xc9)
+		/* MWAIT and MWAITX instructions generate the same error code */
+		if (opcode == 0x010f && (modrm == 0xc9 || modrm == 0xfb))
 			return ES_OK;
 		break;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 622d12ec7f08..bba4e020dd64 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -723,39 +723,8 @@ kernelmode_fixup_or_oops(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(user_mode(regs));
 
 	/* Are we prepared to handle this kernel fault? */
-	if (fixup_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_PF, error_code, address)) {
-		/*
-		 * Any interrupt that takes a fault gets the fixup. This makes
-		 * the below recursive fault logic only apply to a faults from
-		 * task context.
-		 */
-		if (in_interrupt())
-			return;
-
-		/*
-		 * Per the above we're !in_interrupt(), aka. task context.
-		 *
-		 * In this case we need to make sure we're not recursively
-		 * faulting through the emulate_vsyscall() logic.
-		 */
-		if (current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err && signal) {
-			sanitize_error_code(address, &error_code);
-
-			set_signal_archinfo(address, error_code);
-
-			if (si_code == SEGV_PKUERR) {
-				force_sig_pkuerr((void __user *)address, pkey);
-			} else {
-				/* XXX: hwpoison faults will set the wrong code. */
-				force_sig_fault(signal, si_code, (void __user *)address);
-			}
-		}
-
-		/*
-		 * Barring that, we can do the fixup and be happy.
-		 */
+	if (fixup_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_PF, error_code, address))
 		return;
-	}
 
 	/*
 	 * AMD erratum #91 manifests as a spurious page fault on a PREFETCH
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 6f3b3e028718..0a120d85d7bb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -102,6 +102,13 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_setup_arch(void)
 	phys_addr_t total_mem = memblock_phys_mem_size();
 	unsigned long size;
 
+	/*
+	 * Do RMP table fixups after the e820 tables have been setup by
+	 * e820__memory_setup().
+	 */
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP))
+		snp_fixup_e820_tables();
+
 	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		return;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/numa.c b/arch/x86/mm/numa.c
index 65e9a6e391c0..ce84ba86e69e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/numa.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/numa.c
@@ -929,6 +929,8 @@ int memory_add_physaddr_to_nid(u64 start)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(memory_add_physaddr_to_nid);
 
+#endif
+
 static int __init cmp_memblk(const void *a, const void *b)
 {
 	const struct numa_memblk *ma = *(const struct numa_memblk **)a;
@@ -1001,5 +1003,3 @@ int __init numa_fill_memblks(u64 start, u64 end)
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
-
-#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index df5fac428408..59cbc94b6e69 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -1807,36 +1807,41 @@ populate_extable:
 			if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEM ||
 			    BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEMSX) {
 				/* Conservatively check that src_reg + insn->off is a kernel address:
-				 *   src_reg + insn->off >= TASK_SIZE_MAX + PAGE_SIZE
-				 * src_reg is used as scratch for src_reg += insn->off and restored
-				 * after emit_ldx if necessary
+				 *   src_reg + insn->off > TASK_SIZE_MAX + PAGE_SIZE
+				 *   and
+				 *   src_reg + insn->off < VSYSCALL_ADDR
 				 */
 
-				u64 limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX + PAGE_SIZE;
+				u64 limit = TASK_SIZE_MAX + PAGE_SIZE - VSYSCALL_ADDR;
 				u8 *end_of_jmp;
 
-				/* At end of these emitted checks, insn->off will have been added
-				 * to src_reg, so no need to do relative load with insn->off offset
-				 */
-				insn_off = 0;
+				/* movabsq r10, VSYSCALL_ADDR */
+				emit_mov_imm64(&prog, BPF_REG_AX, (long)VSYSCALL_ADDR >> 32,
+					       (u32)(long)VSYSCALL_ADDR);
 
-				/* movabsq r11, limit */
-				EMIT2(add_1mod(0x48, AUX_REG), add_1reg(0xB8, AUX_REG));
-				EMIT((u32)limit, 4);
-				EMIT(limit >> 32, 4);
+				/* mov src_reg, r11 */
+				EMIT_mov(AUX_REG, src_reg);
 
 				if (insn->off) {
-					/* add src_reg, insn->off */
-					maybe_emit_1mod(&prog, src_reg, true);
-					EMIT2_off32(0x81, add_1reg(0xC0, src_reg), insn->off);
+					/* add r11, insn->off */
+					maybe_emit_1mod(&prog, AUX_REG, true);
+					EMIT2_off32(0x81, add_1reg(0xC0, AUX_REG), insn->off);
 				}
 
-				/* cmp src_reg, r11 */
-				maybe_emit_mod(&prog, src_reg, AUX_REG, true);
-				EMIT2(0x39, add_2reg(0xC0, src_reg, AUX_REG));
+				/* sub r11, r10 */
+				maybe_emit_mod(&prog, AUX_REG, BPF_REG_AX, true);
+				EMIT2(0x29, add_2reg(0xC0, AUX_REG, BPF_REG_AX));
+
+				/* movabsq r10, limit */
+				emit_mov_imm64(&prog, BPF_REG_AX, (long)limit >> 32,
+					       (u32)(long)limit);
+
+				/* cmp r10, r11 */
+				maybe_emit_mod(&prog, AUX_REG, BPF_REG_AX, true);
+				EMIT2(0x39, add_2reg(0xC0, AUX_REG, BPF_REG_AX));
 
-				/* if unsigned '>=', goto load */
-				EMIT2(X86_JAE, 0);
+				/* if unsigned '>', goto load */
+				EMIT2(X86_JA, 0);
 				end_of_jmp = prog;
 
 				/* xor dst_reg, dst_reg */
@@ -1862,18 +1867,6 @@ populate_extable:
 				/* populate jmp_offset for JMP above */
 				start_of_ldx[-1] = prog - start_of_ldx;
 
-				if (insn->off && src_reg != dst_reg) {
-					/* sub src_reg, insn->off
-					 * Restore src_reg after "add src_reg, insn->off" in prev
-					 * if statement. But if src_reg == dst_reg, emit_ldx
-					 * above already clobbered src_reg, so no need to restore.
-					 * If add src_reg, insn->off was unnecessary, no need to
-					 * restore either.
-					 */
-					maybe_emit_1mod(&prog, src_reg, true);
-					EMIT2_off32(0x81, add_1reg(0xE8, src_reg), insn->off);
-				}
-
 				if (!bpf_prog->aux->extable)
 					break;
 
@@ -3473,3 +3466,9 @@ bool bpf_jit_supports_ptr_xchg(void)
 {
 	return true;
 }
+
+/* x86-64 JIT emits its own code to filter user addresses so return 0 here */
+u64 bpf_arch_uaddress_limit(void)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
index ab0e8448bb6e..0ae10535c699 100644
--- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
@@ -163,6 +163,42 @@ bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void)
 	return true;
 }
 
+static void __init __snp_fixup_e820_tables(u64 pa)
+{
+	if (IS_ALIGNED(pa, PMD_SIZE))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Handle cases where the RMP table placement by the BIOS is not
+	 * 2M aligned and the kexec kernel could try to allocate
+	 * from within that chunk which then causes a fatal RMP fault.
+	 *
+	 * The e820_table needs to be updated as it is converted to
+	 * kernel memory resources and used by KEXEC_FILE_LOAD syscall
+	 * to load kexec segments.
+	 *
+	 * The e820_table_firmware needs to be updated as it is exposed
+	 * to sysfs and used by the KEXEC_LOAD syscall to load kexec
+	 * segments.
+	 *
+	 * The e820_table_kexec needs to be updated as it passed to
+	 * the kexec-ed kernel.
+	 */
+	pa = ALIGN_DOWN(pa, PMD_SIZE);
+	if (e820__mapped_any(pa, pa + PMD_SIZE, E820_TYPE_RAM)) {
+		pr_info("Reserving start/end of RMP table on a 2MB boundary [0x%016llx]\n", pa);
+		e820__range_update(pa, PMD_SIZE, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED);
+		e820__range_update_table(e820_table_kexec, pa, PMD_SIZE, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED);
+		e820__range_update_table(e820_table_firmware, pa, PMD_SIZE, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED);
+	}
+}
+
+void __init snp_fixup_e820_tables(void)
+{
+	__snp_fixup_e820_tables(probed_rmp_base);
+	__snp_fixup_e820_tables(probed_rmp_base + probed_rmp_size);
+}
+
 /*
  * Do the necessary preparations which are verified by the firmware as
  * described in the SNP_INIT_EX firmware command description in the SNP
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
index ace2eb054053..9ba53814ed6a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
@@ -219,13 +219,21 @@ static __read_mostly unsigned int cpuid_leaf5_edx_val;
 static void xen_cpuid(unsigned int *ax, unsigned int *bx,
 		      unsigned int *cx, unsigned int *dx)
 {
-	unsigned maskebx = ~0;
+	unsigned int maskebx = ~0;
+	unsigned int or_ebx = 0;
 
 	/*
 	 * Mask out inconvenient features, to try and disable as many
 	 * unsupported kernel subsystems as possible.
 	 */
 	switch (*ax) {
+	case 0x1:
+		/* Replace initial APIC ID in bits 24-31 of EBX. */
+		/* See xen_pv_smp_config() for related topology preparations. */
+		maskebx = 0x00ffffff;
+		or_ebx = smp_processor_id() << 24;
+		break;
+
 	case CPUID_MWAIT_LEAF:
 		/* Synthesize the values.. */
 		*ax = 0;
@@ -248,6 +256,7 @@ static void xen_cpuid(unsigned int *ax, unsigned int *bx,
 		: "0" (*ax), "2" (*cx));
 
 	*bx &= maskebx;
+	*bx |= or_ebx;
 }
 
 static bool __init xen_check_mwait(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c
index 27d1a5b7f571..ac41d83b38d3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c
@@ -154,9 +154,9 @@ static void __init xen_pv_smp_config(void)
 	u32 apicid = 0;
 	int i;
 
-	topology_register_boot_apic(apicid++);
+	topology_register_boot_apic(apicid);
 
-	for (i = 1; i < nr_cpu_ids; i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < nr_cpu_ids; i++)
 		topology_register_apic(apicid++, CPU_ACPIID_INVALID, true);
 
 	/* Pretend to be a proper enumerated system */