| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Files | Lines |
|---|
|
CPU features can be determined in makedumpfile, using
'cur_cpu_spec.cpu_features'.
This provides more data to makedumpfile about the crashed system, and
can help in filtering the vmcore accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Aditya Gupta <adityag@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20230920105706.853626-2-adityag@linux.ibm.com
|
|
kasprintf() returns a pointer to dynamically allocated memory
which can be NULL upon failure.
Fixes: 885dcd709ba9 ("powerpc/perf: Add nest IMC PMU support")
Signed-off-by: Kunwu Chan <chentao@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231126093719.1440305-1-chentao@kylinos.cn
|
|
kasprintf() returns a pointer to dynamically allocated memory
which can be NULL upon failure.
Fixes: b9ef7b4b867f ("powerpc: Convert to using %pOFn instead of device_node.name")
Signed-off-by: Kunwu Chan <chentao@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231126095739.1501990-1-chentao@kylinos.cn
|
|
kasprintf() returns a pointer to dynamically allocated memory
which can be NULL upon failure.
Fixes: 2717a33d6074 ("powerpc/opal-irqchip: Use interrupt names if present")
Signed-off-by: Kunwu Chan <chentao@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231127030755.1546750-1-chentao@kylinos.cn
|
|
kasprintf() returns a pointer to dynamically allocated memory
which can be NULL upon failure.
Add a null pointer check, and release 'ent' to avoid memory leaks.
Fixes: bfd2f0d49aef ("powerpc/powernv: Get rid of old scom_controller abstraction")
Signed-off-by: Kunwu Chan <chentao@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231208085937.107210-1-chentao@kylinos.cn
|
|
kasprintf() returns a pointer to dynamically allocated memory
which can be NULL upon failure. Ensure the allocation was successful
by checking the pointer validity.
Suggested-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Kunwu Chan <chentao@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231204023223.2447523-1-chentao@kylinos.cn
|
|
The hypervisor returns migration failure if all VAS windows are not
closed. During pre-migration stage, vas_migration_handler() sets
migration_in_progress flag and closes all windows from the list.
The allocate VAS window routine checks the migration flag, setup
the window and then add it to the list. So there is possibility of
the migration handler missing the window that is still in the
process of setup.
t1: Allocate and open VAS t2: Migration event
window
lock vas_pseries_mutex
If migration_in_progress set
unlock vas_pseries_mutex
return
open window HCALL
unlock vas_pseries_mutex
Modify window HCALL lock vas_pseries_mutex
setup window migration_in_progress=true
Closes all windows from the list
// May miss windows that are
// not in the list
unlock vas_pseries_mutex
lock vas_pseries_mutex return
if nr_closed_windows == 0
// No DLPAR CPU or migration
add window to the list
// Window will be added to the
// list after the setup is completed
unlock vas_pseries_mutex
return
unlock vas_pseries_mutex
Close VAS window
// due to DLPAR CPU or migration
return -EBUSY
This patch resolves the issue with the following steps:
- Set the migration_in_progress flag without holding mutex.
- Introduce nr_open_wins_progress counter in VAS capabilities
struct
- This counter tracks the number of open windows are still in
progress
- The allocate setup window thread closes windows if the migration
is set and decrements nr_open_window_progress counter
- The migration handler waits for no in-progress open windows.
The code flow with the fix is as follows:
t1: Allocate and open VAS t2: Migration event
window
lock vas_pseries_mutex
If migration_in_progress set
unlock vas_pseries_mutex
return
open window HCALL
nr_open_wins_progress++
// Window opened, but not
// added to the list yet
unlock vas_pseries_mutex
Modify window HCALL migration_in_progress=true
setup window lock vas_pseries_mutex
Closes all windows from the list
While nr_open_wins_progress {
unlock vas_pseries_mutex
lock vas_pseries_mutex sleep
if nr_closed_windows == 0 // Wait if any open window in
or migration is not started // progress. The open window
// No DLPAR CPU or migration // thread closes the window without
add window to the list // adding to the list and return if
nr_open_wins_progress-- // the migration is in progress.
unlock vas_pseries_mutex
return
Close VAS window
nr_open_wins_progress--
unlock vas_pseries_mutex
return -EBUSY lock vas_pseries_mutex
}
unlock vas_pseries_mutex
return
Fixes: 37e6764895ef ("powerpc/pseries/vas: Add VAS migration handler")
Signed-off-by: Haren Myneni <haren@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231125235104.3405008-1-haren@linux.ibm.com
|
|
Commit d49a0626216b95 ("arch: Introduce CONFIG_FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT")
introduced a generic function-alignment infrastructure. Move to using
FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_4B on powerpc, to use the same alignment as that of
the existing _GLOBAL macro.
Signed-off-by: Sathvika Vasireddy <sv@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/21892186ec44abe24df0daf64f577dac0e78783f.1702045299.git.naveen@kernel.org
|
|
ftrace_stub is within the same CU, so there is no need for a subsequent
nop instruction.
Signed-off-by: Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/8ee5ec520e37d5523654bb2cd65a17512fb774e2.1702045299.git.naveen@kernel.org
|
|
Replace seven spaces with a tab character to fix an indentation issue
reported by the kernel test robot.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202311221731.alUwTDIm-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/9f058227bd9243f0842786ef7228d87ab10d29f6.1702045299.git.naveen@kernel.org
|
|
Until now the papr_sysparm APIs have been kernel-internal. But user
space needs access to PAPR system parameters too. The only method
available to user space today to get or set system parameters is using
sys_rtas() and /dev/mem to pass RTAS-addressable buffers between user
space and firmware. This is incompatible with lockdown and should be
deprecated.
So provide an alternative ABI to user space in the form of a
/dev/papr-sysparm character device with just two ioctl commands (get
and set). The data payloads involved are small enough to fit in the
ioctl argument buffer, making the code relatively simple.
Exposing the system parameters through sysfs has been considered but
it would be too awkward:
* The kernel currently does not have to contain an exhaustive list of
defined system parameters. This is a convenient property to maintain
because we don't have to update the kernel whenever a new parameter
is added to PAPR. Exporting a named attribute in sysfs for each
parameter would negate this.
* Some system parameters are text-based and some are not.
* Retrieval of at least one system parameter requires input data,
which a simple read-oriented interface can't support.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-11-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
|
|
The ability to get and set system parameters will be exposed to user
space, so let's get a little more strict about malformed
papr_sysparm_buf objects.
* Create accessors for the length field of struct papr_sysparm_buf.
The length is always stored in MSB order and this is better than
spreading the necessary conversions all over.
* Reject attempts to submit invalid buffers to RTAS.
* Warn if RTAS returns a buffer with an invalid length, clamping the
returned length to a safe value that won't overrun the buffer.
These are meant as precautionary measures to mitigate both firmware
and kernel bugs in this area, should they arise, but I am not aware of
any.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-10-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
|
|
PowerVM LPARs may retrieve Vital Product Data (VPD) for system
components using the ibm,get-vpd RTAS function.
We can expose this to user space with a /dev/papr-vpd character
device, where the programming model is:
struct papr_location_code plc = { .str = "", }; /* obtain all VPD */
int devfd = open("/dev/papr-vpd", O_RDONLY);
int vpdfd = ioctl(devfd, PAPR_VPD_CREATE_HANDLE, &plc);
size_t size = lseek(vpdfd, 0, SEEK_END);
char *buf = malloc(size);
pread(devfd, buf, size, 0);
When a file descriptor is obtained from ioctl(PAPR_VPD_CREATE_HANDLE),
the file contains the result of a complete ibm,get-vpd sequence. The
file contents are immutable from the POV of user space. To get a new
view of the VPD, the client must create a new handle.
This design choice insulates user space from most of the complexities
that ibm,get-vpd brings:
* ibm,get-vpd must be called more than once to obtain complete
results.
* Only one ibm,get-vpd call sequence should be in progress at a time;
interleaved sequences will disrupt each other. Callers must have a
protocol for serializing their use of the function.
* A call sequence in progress may receive a "VPD changed, try again"
status, requiring the client to abandon the sequence and start
over.
The memory required for the VPD buffers seems acceptable, around 20KB
for all VPD on one of my systems. And the value of the
/rtas/ibm,vpd-size DT property (the estimated maximum size of VPD) is
consistently 300KB across various systems I've checked.
I've implemented support for this new ABI in the rtas_get_vpd()
function in librtas, which the vpdupdate command currently uses to
populate its VPD database. I've verified that an unmodified vpdupdate
binary generates an identical database when using a librtas.so that
prefers the new ABI.
Along with the papr-vpd.h header exposed to user space, this
introduces a common papr-miscdev.h uapi header to share a base ioctl
ID with similar drivers to come.
Tested-by: Michal Suchánek <msuchanek@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-9-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
|
|
If the function descriptor has a populated lock member, then callers
are required to hold it across calls. Now that the firmware activation
sequence is appropriately guarded, we can warn when the requirement
isn't satisfied.
__do_enter_rtas_trace() gets reorganized a bit as a result of
performing the function descriptor lookup unconditionally now.
Reviewed-by: "Aneesh Kumar K.V (IBM)" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-8-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
|
|
Use rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock to prevent interleaving call
sequences of the ibm,activate-firmware RTAS function, which typically
requires multiple calls to complete the update. While the spec does
not specifically prohibit interleaved sequences, there's almost
certainly no advantage to allowing them.
Reviewed-by: "Aneesh Kumar K.V (IBM)" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-7-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
|
|
On RTAS platforms there is a general restriction that the OS must not
enter RTAS on more than one CPU at a time. This low-level
serialization requirement is satisfied by holding a spin
lock (rtas_lock) across most RTAS function invocations.
However, some pseries RTAS functions require multiple successive calls
to complete a logical operation. Beginning a new call sequence for such a
function may disrupt any other sequences of that function already in
progress. Safe and reliable use of these functions effectively
requires higher-level serialization beyond what is already done at the
level of RTAS entry and exit.
Where a sequence-based RTAS function is invoked only through
sys_rtas(), with no in-kernel users, there is no issue as far as the
kernel is concerned. User space is responsible for appropriately
serializing its call sequences. (Whether user space code actually
takes measures to prevent sequence interleaving is another matter.)
Examples of such functions currently include ibm,platform-dump and
ibm,get-vpd.
But where a sequence-based RTAS function has both user space and
in-kernel uesrs, there is a hazard. Even if the in-kernel call sites
of such a function serialize their sequences correctly, a user of
sys_rtas() can invoke the same function at any time, potentially
disrupting a sequence in progress.
So in order to prevent disruption of kernel-based RTAS call sequences,
they must serialize not only with themselves but also with sys_rtas()
users, somehow. Preferably without adding more function-specific hacks
to sys_rtas(). This is a prerequisite for adding an in-kernel call
sequence of ibm,get-vpd, which is in a change to follow.
Note that it has never been feasible for the kernel to prevent
sys_rtas()-based sequences from being disrupted because control
returns to user space on every call. sys_rtas()-based users of these
functions have always been, and continue to be, responsible for
coordinating their call sequences with other users, even those which
may invoke the RTAS functions through less direct means than
sys_rtas(). This is an unavoidable consequence of exposing
sequence-based RTAS functions through sys_rtas().
* Add an optional mutex member to struct rtas_function.
* Statically define a mutex for each RTAS function with known call
sequence serialization requirements, and assign its address to the
.lock member of the corresponding function table entry, along with
justifying commentary.
* In sys_rtas(), if the table entry for the RTAS function being
called has a populated lock member, acquire it before taking
rtas_lock and entering RTAS.
* Kernel-based RTAS call sequences are expected to access the
appropriate mutex explicitly by name. For example, a user of the
ibm,activate-firmware RTAS function would do:
int token = rtas_function_token(RTAS_FN_IBM_ACTIVATE_FIRMWARE);
int fwrc;
mutex_lock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock);
do {
fwrc = rtas_call(token, 0, 1, NULL);
} while (rtas_busy_delay(fwrc));
mutex_unlock(&rtas_ibm_activate_firmware_lock);
There should be no perceivable change introduced here except that
concurrent callers of the same RTAS function via sys_rtas() may block
on a mutex instead of spinning on rtas_lock.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-6-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
|
|
The rtas system call handler sys_rtas() delegates certain input
validation steps to a helper function: block_rtas_call(). One of these
steps ensures that the user-supplied token value maps to a known RTAS
function. This is done by performing a "reverse" token-to-function
lookup via rtas_token_to_function_untrusted() to obtain an
rtas_function object.
In changes to come, sys_rtas() itself will need the function
descriptor for the token. To prepare:
* Move the lookup and validation up into sys_rtas() and pass the
resulting rtas_function pointer to block_rtas_call(), which is
otherwise unconcerned with the token value.
* Change block_rtas_call() to report the RTAS function name instead of
the token value on validation failures, since it can now rely on
having a valid function descriptor.
One behavior change is that sys_rtas() now silently errors out when
passed a bad token, before calling block_rtas_call(). So we will no
longer log "RTAS call blocked - exploit attempt?" on invalid
tokens. This is consistent with how sys_rtas() currently handles other
"metadata" (nargs and nret), while block_rtas_call() is primarily
concerned with validating the arguments to be passed to specific RTAS
functions.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-5-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
|
|
Not all of the generic RTAS function statuses specified in PAPR have
symbolic constants and descriptions in rtas.h. Fix this, providing a
little more background, slightly updating the existing wording, and
improving the formatting.
Reviewed-by: "Aneesh Kumar K.V (IBM)" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-4-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
|
|
Enabling any of the powerpc:rtas_* tracepoints at boot is likely to
result in an oops on RTAS platforms. For example, booting a QEMU
pseries model with 'trace_event=powerpc:rtas_input' in the command
line leads to:
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000008
Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 7 [#1]
NIP [c00000000004231c] do_enter_rtas+0x1bc/0x460
LR [c00000000004231c] do_enter_rtas+0x1bc/0x460
Call Trace:
do_enter_rtas+0x1bc/0x460 (unreliable)
rtas_call+0x22c/0x4a0
rtas_get_boot_time+0x80/0x14c
read_persistent_clock64+0x124/0x150
read_persistent_wall_and_boot_offset+0x28/0x58
timekeeping_init+0x70/0x348
start_kernel+0xa0c/0xc1c
start_here_common+0x1c/0x20
(This is preceded by a warning for the failed lookup in
rtas_token_to_function().)
This happens when __do_enter_rtas_trace() attempts a token to function
descriptor lookup before the xarray containing the mappings has been
set up.
Fall back to linear scan of the table if rtas_token_to_function_xarray
is empty.
Fixes: 24098f580e2b ("powerpc/rtas: add tracepoints around RTAS entry")
Reviewed-by: "Aneesh Kumar K.V (IBM)" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-3-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
|
|
Add a convenience macro for iterating over every element of the
internal function table and convert the one site that can use it. An
additional user of the macro is anticipated in changes to follow.
Reviewed-by: "Aneesh Kumar K.V (IBM)" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-2-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
|
|
rtas_token_to_function() WARNs when passed an invalid token; it's
meant to catch bugs in kernel-based users of RTAS functions. However,
user space controls the token value passed to rtas_token_to_function()
by block_rtas_call(), so user space with sufficient privilege to use
sys_rtas() can trigger the warnings at will:
unexpected failed lookup for token 2048
WARNING: CPU: 20 PID: 2247 at arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:556
rtas_token_to_function+0xfc/0x110
...
NIP rtas_token_to_function+0xfc/0x110
LR rtas_token_to_function+0xf8/0x110
Call Trace:
rtas_token_to_function+0xf8/0x110 (unreliable)
sys_rtas+0x188/0x880
system_call_exception+0x268/0x530
system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4
It's desirable to continue warning on bogus tokens in
rtas_token_to_function(). Currently it is used to look up RTAS
function descriptors when tracing, where we know there has to have
been a successful descriptor lookup by different means already, and it
would be a serious inconsistency for the reverse lookup to fail.
So instead of weakening rtas_token_to_function()'s contract by
removing the warnings, introduce rtas_token_to_function_untrusted(),
which has no opinion on failed lookups. Convert block_rtas_call() and
rtas_token_to_function() to use it.
Fixes: 8252b88294d2 ("powerpc/rtas: improve function information lookups")
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231212-papr-sys_rtas-vs-lockdown-v6-1-e9eafd0c8c6c@linux.ibm.com
|
|
affinity_domain_via_partition_show function
To access hv-gpci kernel interface files data, the
"Enable Performance Information Collection" option has to be set
in hmc. Incase that option is not set and user try to read
the interface files, it should give error message as
operation not permitted.
Result of accessing added interface files with disabled
performance collection option:
[command]# cat processor_bus_topology
cat: processor_bus_topology: Operation not permitted
[command]# cat processor_config
cat: processor_config: Operation not permitted
[command]# cat affinity_domain_via_domain
cat: affinity_domain_via_domain: Operation not permitted
[command]# cat affinity_domain_via_virtual_processor
cat: affinity_domain_via_virtual_processor: Operation not permitted
[command]# cat affinity_domain_via_partition
Based on above result there is no error message when reading
affinity_domain_via_partition file because of missing
check for failed hcall. Fix this issue by adding
a check in the start of affinity_domain_via_partition_show
function, to return error incase hcall fails, with error type
other then H_PARAMETER.
Fixes: a15e0d6a6929 ("powerpc/hv_gpci: Add sysfs file inside hv_gpci device to show affinity domain via partition information")
Reported-by: Disha Goel <disgoel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231116122033.160964-1-kjain@linux.ibm.com
|
|
We need the serial fixes in here as well to build off of.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
This is required for the later patch "Makefile.extrawarn: turn on
missing-prototypes globally".
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231127132809.45c2b398@canb.auug.org.au
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
IA-64 was the only architecture which selected ARCH_TASK_STRUCT_ON_STACK.
IA-64 was removed with commit cf8e8658100d ("arch: Remove Itanium (IA-64)
architecture"). Therefore remove support for ARCH_TASK_STRUCT_ON_STACK
as well.
Note: this also reveals a potential bug in powerpc code, which makes use of
__init_task_data without selecting ARCH_TASK_STRUCT_ON_STACK which makes
__init_task_data a no-op. This is broken since commit d11ed3ab3166 ("Expand
INIT_TASK() in init/init_task.c and remove") from 2018 and needs to be
addressed separately.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231116133638.1636277-4-hca@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
|
All platforms with a kernel irqchip have support for irqfd. Unify the
two configuration items so that userspace can expect to use irqfd to
inject interrupts into the irqchip.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
virt/kvm/eventfd.c is compiled unconditionally, meaning that the ioeventfds
member of struct kvm is accessed unconditionally. CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_EVENTFD
therefore must be defined for KVM common code to compile successfully,
remove it.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Switch character types to u8 and sizes to size_t. To conform to
characters/sizes in the rest of the tty layer.
Signed-off-by: "Jiri Slaby (SUSE)" <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Amit Shah <amit@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: virtualization@lists.linux.dev
Cc: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231206073712.17776-13-jirislaby@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
If no cross compiler is specified, try to auto detect one.
Look for various combinations, matching:
powerpc(64(le)?)?(-unknown)?-linux(-gnu)?-
There are more possibilities, but the above is known to find a compiler
on Fedora and Ubuntu (which use linux-gnu-), and also detects the
kernel.org cross compilers (which use linux-).
This allows cross compiling with simply:
# Ubuntu
$ sudo apt install gcc-powerpc-linux-gnu
# Fedora
$ sudo dnf install gcc-powerpc64-linux-gnu
$ make ARCH=powerpc defconfig
$ make ARCH=powerpc -j 4
Inspired by arch/parisc/Makefile.
Acked-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231206115548.1466874-4-mpe@ellerman.id.au
|
|
If the kernel is being cross compiled, there is no information from
uname on which defconfig is most appropriate, so the Makefile defaults
to ppc64.
However these days almost all distros that support powerpc are little
endian, so it's more likely that defaulting to ppc64le_defconfig will
produce something useful for a user.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231206115548.1466874-3-mpe@ellerman.id.au
|
|
The vdso Makefile adds -U$(ARCH) to CPPFLAGS for the vdso64.lds linker
script. ARCH is always powerpc, so it becomes -Upowerpc, which means
undefine the "powerpc" symbol.
But the 64-bit compiler doesn't define powerpc in the first place,
compare:
$ gcc-5.1.0-nolibc/powerpc64-linux/bin/powerpc64-linux-gcc -m32 -E -dM - </dev/null | grep -w powerpc
#define powerpc 1
$ gcc-5.1.0-nolibc/powerpc64-linux/bin/powerpc64-linux-gcc -m64 -E -dM - </dev/null | grep -w powerpc
$
So there's no need to undefine it for the 64-bit linker script.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231206115548.1466874-2-mpe@ellerman.id.au
|
|
There's no need to use $(ARCH) for references to the arch directory in
the source tree, it is always arch/powerpc.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231206115548.1466874-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
|
|
This reverts commit 1abce0580b89 ("powerpc/64s: Fix __pte_needs_flush()
false positive warning")
The previous patch dropped the usage of _PAGE_PRIVILEGED with PAGE_NONE.
Hence this check can be dropped.
Signed-off-by: "Aneesh Kumar K.V (IBM)" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231204093638.71503-2-aneesh.kumar@kernel.org
|
|
There used to be a dependency on _PAGE_PRIVILEGED with pte_savedwrite.
But that got dropped by
commit 6a56ccbcf6c6 ("mm/autonuma: use can_change_(pte|pmd)_writable() to replace savedwrite")
With the change in this patch numa fault pte (pte_protnone()) gets mapped as regular user pte
with RWX cleared (no-access) whereas earlier it used to be mapped _PAGE_PRIVILEGED.
Hash fault handling code gets some WARN_ON added in this patch because
those functions are not expected to get called with _PAGE_READ cleared.
commit 18061c17c8ec ("powerpc/mm: Update PROTFAULT handling in the page
fault path") explains the details.
Signed-off-by: "Aneesh Kumar K.V (IBM)" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231204093638.71503-1-aneesh.kumar@kernel.org
|
|
In the nestedv2 case, if there is a pending decrementer exception, the
L1 must get the L2's timebase from the L0 to see if the exception should
be cancelled. This adds the overhead of a H_GUEST_GET_STATE call to the
likely case in which the decrementer should not be cancelled.
Avoid this logic for the nestedv2 case.
Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231201132618.555031-13-vaibhav@linux.ibm.com
|
|
Commit 709236039964 ("KVM: PPC: Reimplement non-SIMD LOAD/STORE
instruction mmio emulation with analyse_instr() input") and
commit 2b33cb585f94 ("KVM: PPC: Reimplement LOAD_FP/STORE_FP instruction
mmio emulation with analyse_instr() input") made
kvmppc_emulate_loadstore() use the results from analyse_instr() for
instruction emulation. In particular the effective address from
analyse_instr() is used for UPDATE type instructions and fact that
op.val is all ready endian corrected is used in the STORE case.
However, these changes now have some negative implications for the
nestedv2 case. For analyse_instr() to determine the correct effective
address, the GPRs must be loaded from the L0. This is not needed as
vcpu->arch.vaddr_accessed is already set. Change back to using
vcpu->arch.vaddr_accessed.
In the STORE case, use kvmppc_get_gpr() value instead of the op.val.
kvmppc_get_gpr() will reload from the L0 if needed in the nestedv2 case.
This means if a byte reversal is needed must now be passed to
kvmppc_handle_store() like in the kvmppc_handle_load() case.
This means the call to kvmhv_nestedv2_reload_ptregs() can be avoided as
there is no concern about op.val being stale. Drop the call to
kvmhv_nestedv2_mark_dirty_ptregs() as without the call to
kvmhv_nestedv2_reload_ptregs(), stale state could be marked as valid.
This is fine as the required marking things dirty is already handled for
the UPDATE case by the call to kvmppc_set_gpr(). For LOADs, it is
handled in kvmppc_complete_mmio_load(). This is called either directly
in __kvmppc_handle_load() if the load can be handled in KVM, or on the
next kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run() if an exit was required.
Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231201132618.555031-12-vaibhav@linux.ibm.com
|
|
In the nestedv2 case, the L1 may register the L2's VPA with the L0. This
allows the L0 to manage the L2's dispatch count, as well as enable
possible performance optimisations by seeing if certain resources are
not being used by the L2 (such as the PMCs).
Use the H_GUEST_SET_STATE call to inform the L0 of the L2's VPA
address. This can not be done in the H_GUEST_VCPU_RUN input buffer.
Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231201132618.555031-11-vaibhav@linux.ibm.com
|
|
H_COPY_TOFROM_GUEST is part of the nestedv1 API and so should not be
called by a nestedv2 host. Do not attempt to call it.
Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231201132618.555031-10-vaibhav@linux.ibm.com
|
|
The msr check in kvmppc_handle_exit_hv() is not needed for nestedv2 hosts,
skip the check to avoid a H_GUEST_GET_STATE hcall.
Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231201132618.555031-9-vaibhav@linux.ibm.com
|
|
There is no need to inject an external interrupt in
kvmppc_book3s_irqprio_deliver() as the test for BOOK3S_IRQPRIO_EXTERNAL
in kvmhv_run_single_vcpu() before guest entry will raise LPCR_MER if
needed. There is also no need to inject the decrementer interrupt as
this will be raised within the L2 if needed. Avoiding these injections
reduces H_GUEST_GET_STATE hcalls by the L1.
Suggested-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231201132618.555031-8-vaibhav@linux.ibm.com
|
|
Commit 026728dc5d41 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV P9: Inject pending xive
interrupts at guest entry") changed guest entry so that if external
interrupts are enabled, BOOK3S_IRQPRIO_EXTERNAL is not tested for. Test
for this regardless of MSR_EE.
For an L1 host, do not inject an interrupt, but always
use LPCR_MER. If the L0 desires it can inject an interrupt.
Fixes: 026728dc5d41 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV P9: Inject pending xive interrupts at guest entry")
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
[jpn: use kvmpcc_get_msr(), write commit message]
Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231201132618.555031-7-vaibhav@linux.ibm.com
|
|
LPCR_MER is conditionally set during entry to a guest if there is a
pending external interrupt. In the nestedv2 case, this change is not
being communicated to the L0, which means it is not being set in the L2.
Ensure the updated LPCR value is passed to the L0.
Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231201132618.555031-6-vaibhav@linux.ibm.com
|
|
kvmhv_copy_tofrom_guest_radix() gets the PID at the start of the
function. If pid is not used, then this is a wasteful H_GUEST_GET_STATE
hcall for nestedv2 hosts. Move the assignment to where pid will be used.
Suggested-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231201132618.555031-5-vaibhav@linux.ibm.com
|
|
The check for a hcall coming from userspace is done for KVM-PR. This is
not supported for nestedv2 and the L0 will directly inject the necessary
exception to the L2 if userspace performs a hcall. Avoid checking the
MSR and thus avoid a H_GUEST_GET_STATE hcall in the L1.
Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231201132618.555031-4-vaibhav@linux.ibm.com
|
|
The kvmppc_get_tb_offset() getter reloads KVMPPC_GSID_TB_OFFSET from the
L0 for nestedv2 host. This is unnecessary as the value does not change.
KVMPPC_GSID_TB_OFFSET also need not be reloaded in
kvmppc_{s,g}et_dec_expires().
Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231201132618.555031-3-vaibhav@linux.ibm.com
|
|
An L0 must invalidate the L2's RPT during H_GUEST_DELETE if this has not
already been done. This is a slow operation that means H_GUEST_DELETE
must return H_BUSY multiple times before completing. Invalidating the
tables before deleting the guest so there is less work for the L0 to do.
Signed-off-by: Jordan Niethe <jniethe5@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231201132618.555031-2-vaibhav@linux.ibm.com
|
|
Commit 41a506ef71eb ("powerpc/ftrace: Create a dummy stackframe to fix
stack unwind") added use of a new stack frame on ftrace entry to fix
stack unwind. However, the commit missed updating the offset used while
tearing down the ftrace stack when ftrace is disabled. Fix the same.
In addition, the commit missed saving the correct stack pointer in
pt_regs. Update the same.
Fixes: 41a506ef71eb ("powerpc/ftrace: Create a dummy stackframe to fix stack unwind")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.5+
Signed-off-by: Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231130065947.2188860-1-naveen@kernel.org
|
|
Replace 0x7f literals with PCI_HEADER_TYPE_MASK.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231124090919.23687-2-ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
|
|
When an add operation for multiple LMBs fails, there is currently
little indication from the kernel of what went wrong. Be a little more
verbose about error conditions in the add paths.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231114-pseries-memhp-fixes-v1-3-fb8f2bb7c557@linux.ibm.com
|
|
dlpar_memory_remove_by_index() may access beyond the bounds of the
drmem lmb array when the LMB lookup fails to match an entry with the
given DRC index. When the search fails, the cursor is left pointing to
&drmem_info->lmbs[drmem_info->n_lmbs], which is one element past the
last valid entry in the array. The debug message at the end of the
function then dereferences this pointer:
pr_debug("Failed to hot-remove memory at %llx\n",
lmb->base_addr);
This was found by inspection and confirmed with KASAN:
pseries-hotplug-mem: Attempting to hot-remove LMB, drc index 1234
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in dlpar_memory+0x298/0x1658
Read of size 8 at addr c000000364e97fd0 by task bash/949
dump_stack_lvl+0xa4/0xfc (unreliable)
print_report+0x214/0x63c
kasan_report+0x140/0x2e0
__asan_load8+0xa8/0xe0
dlpar_memory+0x298/0x1658
handle_dlpar_errorlog+0x130/0x1d0
dlpar_store+0x18c/0x3e0
kobj_attr_store+0x68/0xa0
sysfs_kf_write+0xc4/0x110
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x26c/0x390
vfs_write+0x2d4/0x4e0
ksys_write+0xac/0x1a0
system_call_exception+0x268/0x530
system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
Allocated by task 1:
kasan_save_stack+0x48/0x80
kasan_set_track+0x34/0x50
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x34/0x50
__kasan_kmalloc+0xd0/0x120
__kmalloc+0x8c/0x320
kmalloc_array.constprop.0+0x48/0x5c
drmem_init+0x2a0/0x41c
do_one_initcall+0xe0/0x5c0
kernel_init_freeable+0x4ec/0x5a0
kernel_init+0x30/0x1e0
ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c
The buggy address belongs to the object at c000000364e80000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128k of size 131072
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 98256-byte region [c000000364e80000, c000000364e97fd0)
==================================================================
pseries-hotplug-mem: Failed to hot-remove memory at 0
Log failed lookups with a separate message and dereference the
cursor only when it points to a valid entry.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: 51925fb3c5c9 ("powerpc/pseries: Implement memory hotplug remove in the kernel")
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20231114-pseries-memhp-fixes-v1-1-fb8f2bb7c557@linux.ibm.com
|
Aditya Gupta
Kunwu Chan
Haren Myneni
Sathvika Vasireddy
Naveen N Rao
Nathan Lynch
Kajol Jain
Greg Kroah-Hartman
Stephen Rothwell
Heiko Carstens
Paolo Bonzini
Jiri Slaby (SUSE)
Michael Ellerman
Aneesh Kumar K.V (IBM)
Jordan Niethe
Nicholas Piggin
Ilpo Järvinen
