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author | 2009-07-10 10:46:30 -0700 | |
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committer | 2009-07-13 08:01:47 +1000 | |
commit | b3a633c8527ef155b1a4e22e8f5abc58f7af54c9 (patch) | |
tree | 4d5e16c82db298320c3515dca9f6eeca27164b3b /.mailmap | |
parent | SELinux: Convert avc_audit to use lsm_audit.h (diff) | |
download | linux-b3a633c8527ef155b1a4e22e8f5abc58f7af54c9.tar.gz linux-b3a633c8527ef155b1a4e22e8f5abc58f7af54c9.tar.bz2 linux-b3a633c8527ef155b1a4e22e8f5abc58f7af54c9.zip |
personality handling: fix PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID for security reasons
We have found that the current PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID mask on Linux
doesn't include neither ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT, nor MMAP_PAGE_ZERO.
The current mask is READ_IMPLIES_EXEC|ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE.
We believe it is important to add MMAP_PAGE_ZERO, because by using
this personality it is possible to have the first page mapped inside a
process running as setuid root. This could be used in those scenarios:
- Exploiting a NULL pointer dereference issue in a setuid root binary
- Bypassing the mmap_min_addr restrictions of the Linux kernel: by
running a setuid binary that would drop privileges before giving us
control back (for instance by loading a user-supplied library), we
could get the first page mapped in a process we control. By further
using mremap and mprotect on this mapping, we can then completely
bypass the mmap_min_addr restrictions.
Less importantly, we believe ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT should also be added
since on x86 32bits it will in practice disable most of the address
space layout randomization (only the stack will remain randomized).
Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <jt@cr0.org>
Signed-off-by: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@sdf.lonestar.org>
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to '.mailmap')
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