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author | 2008-04-18 18:18:30 -0700 | |
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committer | 2008-04-18 18:18:30 -0700 | |
commit | 3925e6fc1f774048404fdd910b0345b06c699eb4 (patch) | |
tree | c9a58417d9492f39f7fe81d4721d674c34dd8be2 | |
parent | Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6.26 (diff) | |
parent | security: fix up documentation for security_module_enable (diff) | |
download | linux-3925e6fc1f774048404fdd910b0345b06c699eb4.tar.gz linux-3925e6fc1f774048404fdd910b0345b06c699eb4.tar.bz2 linux-3925e6fc1f774048404fdd910b0345b06c699eb4.zip |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6:
security: fix up documentation for security_module_enable
Security: Introduce security= boot parameter
Audit: Final renamings and cleanup
SELinux: use new audit hooks, remove redundant exports
Audit: internally use the new LSM audit hooks
LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks
SELinux: remove redundant exports
Netlink: Use generic LSM hook
Audit: use new LSM hooks instead of SELinux exports
SELinux: setup new inode/ipc getsecid hooks
LSM: Introduce inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid hooks
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/audit.h | 29 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/security.h | 114 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/selinux.h | 134 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/audit.c | 24 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/audit.h | 25 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/auditfilter.c | 99 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/auditsc.c | 74 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/dummy.c | 51 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 73 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/exports.c | 42 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 34 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/audit.h | 65 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/services.c | 45 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack.h | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smackfs.c | 11 |
18 files changed, 503 insertions, 335 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt index 256a2162503c..4b0f1ae31a4c 100644 --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -366,6 +366,12 @@ and is between 256 and 4096 characters. It is defined in the file possible to determine what the correct size should be. This option provides an override for these situations. + security= [SECURITY] Choose a security module to enable at boot. + If this boot parameter is not specified, only the first + security module asking for security registration will be + loaded. An invalid security module name will be treated + as if no module has been chosen. + capability.disable= [SECURITY] Disable capabilities. This would normally be used only if an alternative security model is to be diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h index 2af9ec025015..4ccb048cae1d 100644 --- a/include/linux/audit.h +++ b/include/linux/audit.h @@ -353,6 +353,33 @@ struct netlink_skb_parms; struct linux_binprm; struct mq_attr; struct mqstat; +struct audit_watch; +struct audit_tree; + +struct audit_krule { + int vers_ops; + u32 flags; + u32 listnr; + u32 action; + u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE]; + u32 buflen; /* for data alloc on list rules */ + u32 field_count; + char *filterkey; /* ties events to rules */ + struct audit_field *fields; + struct audit_field *arch_f; /* quick access to arch field */ + struct audit_field *inode_f; /* quick access to an inode field */ + struct audit_watch *watch; /* associated watch */ + struct audit_tree *tree; /* associated watched tree */ + struct list_head rlist; /* entry in audit_{watch,tree}.rules list */ +}; + +struct audit_field { + u32 type; + u32 val; + u32 op; + char *lsm_str; + void *lsm_rule; +}; #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1 @@ -536,6 +563,8 @@ extern void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *prefix, struct path *path); extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message); +extern int audit_update_lsm_rules(void); + /* Private API (for audit.c only) */ extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type); extern int audit_filter_type(int type); diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index f5eb9ff47ac5..fea1f4aa4dd5 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -36,7 +36,11 @@ extern unsigned securebits; +/* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */ +#define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10 + struct ctl_table; +struct audit_krule; /* * These functions are in security/capability.c and are used @@ -136,6 +140,12 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) /** * struct security_operations - main security structure * + * Security module identifier. + * + * @name: + * A string that acts as a unique identifeir for the LSM with max number + * of characters = SECURITY_NAME_MAX. + * * Security hooks for program execution operations. * * @bprm_alloc_security: @@ -468,6 +478,11 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) * @dentry is the dentry being changed. * Return 0 on success. If error is returned, then the operation * causing setuid bit removal is failed. + * @inode_getsecid: + * Get the secid associated with the node. + * @inode contains a pointer to the inode. + * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved. + * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. * * Security hooks for file operations * @@ -636,6 +651,8 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) * @task_getsecid: * Retrieve the security identifier of the process @p. * @p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @secid. + * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. + * * @task_setgroups: * Check permission before setting the supplementary group set of the * current process. @@ -997,6 +1014,11 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) * @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure * @flag contains the desired (requested) permission set * Return 0 if permission is granted. + * @ipc_getsecid: + * Get the secid associated with the ipc object. + * @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure. + * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved. + * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. * * Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC message queues * @msg_msg_alloc_security: @@ -1223,9 +1245,42 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) * @secdata contains the security context. * @seclen contains the length of the security context. * + * Security hooks for Audit + * + * @audit_rule_init: + * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure. + * @field contains the required Audit action. Fields flags are defined in include/linux/audit.h + * @op contains the operator the rule uses. + * @rulestr contains the context where the rule will be applied to. + * @lsmrule contains a pointer to receive the result. + * Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, + * -EINVAL in case of an invalid rule. + * + * @audit_rule_known: + * Specifies whether given @rule contains any fields related to current LSM. + * @rule contains the audit rule of interest. + * Return 1 in case of relation found, 0 otherwise. + * + * @audit_rule_match: + * Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved + * by @audit_rule_known. + * @secid contains the security id in question. + * @field contains the field which relates to current LSM. + * @op contains the operator that will be used for matching. + * @rule points to the audit rule that will be checked against. + * @actx points to the audit context associated with the check. + * Return 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on failure. + * + * @audit_rule_free: + * Deallocate the LSM audit rule structure previously allocated by + * audit_rule_init. + * @rule contains the allocated rule + * * This is the main security structure. */ struct security_operations { + char name[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1]; + int (*ptrace) (struct task_struct * parent, struct task_struct * child); int (*capget) (struct task_struct * target, kernel_cap_t * effective, @@ -1317,6 +1372,7 @@ struct security_operations { int (*inode_getsecurity)(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc); int (*inode_setsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags); int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size); + void (*inode_getsecid)(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid); int (*file_permission) (struct file * file, int mask); int (*file_alloc_security) (struct file * file); @@ -1369,6 +1425,7 @@ struct security_operations { void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode); int (*ipc_permission) (struct kern_ipc_perm * ipcp, short flag); + void (*ipc_getsecid) (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid); int (*msg_msg_alloc_security) (struct msg_msg * msg); void (*msg_msg_free_security) (struct msg_msg * msg); @@ -1480,10 +1537,18 @@ struct security_operations { #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + int (*audit_rule_init)(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule); + int (*audit_rule_known)(struct audit_krule *krule); + int (*audit_rule_match)(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule, + struct audit_context *actx); + void (*audit_rule_free)(void *lsmrule); +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ }; /* prototypes */ extern int security_init (void); +extern int security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops); extern int register_security (struct security_operations *ops); extern int mod_reg_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops); extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, mode_t mode, @@ -1578,6 +1643,7 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry); int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc); int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags); int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size); +void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid); int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask); int security_file_alloc(struct file *file); void security_file_free(struct file *file); @@ -1622,6 +1688,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, void security_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p); void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode); int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag); +void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid); int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg); void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg); int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct msg_queue *msq); @@ -2022,6 +2089,11 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, return 0; } +static inline void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) +{ + *secid = 0; +} + static inline int security_file_permission (struct file *file, int mask) { return 0; @@ -2137,7 +2209,9 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid (struct task_struct *p) } static inline void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) -{ } +{ + *secid = 0; +} static inline int security_task_setgroups (struct group_info *group_info) { @@ -2216,6 +2290,11 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, return 0; } +static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) +{ + *secid = 0; +} + static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg * msg) { return 0; @@ -2672,5 +2751,38 @@ static inline int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, #endif #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule); +int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule); +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule, + struct audit_context *actx); +void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule); + +#else + +static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, + void **lsmrule) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, + void *lsmrule, struct audit_context *actx) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) +{ } + +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ + #endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/selinux.h b/include/linux/selinux.h index 8c2cc4c02526..20f965d4b041 100644 --- a/include/linux/selinux.h +++ b/include/linux/selinux.h @@ -16,99 +16,11 @@ struct selinux_audit_rule; struct audit_context; -struct inode; struct kern_ipc_perm; #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX /** - * selinux_audit_rule_init - alloc/init an selinux audit rule structure. - * @field: the field this rule refers to - * @op: the operater the rule uses - * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule - * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this - * - * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure - * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with - * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use. - */ -int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - struct selinux_audit_rule **rule); - -/** - * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure. - * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to be freed - * - * This will free all memory associated with the given rule. - * If @rule is NULL, no operation is performed. - */ -void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule); - -/** - * selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule. - * @sid: the context ID to check - * @field: the field this rule refers to - * @op: the operater the rule uses - * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against - * @actx: the audit context (can be NULL) associated with the check - * - * Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and - * -errno on failure. - */ -int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, - struct selinux_audit_rule *rule, - struct audit_context *actx); - -/** - * selinux_audit_set_callback - set the callback for policy reloads. - * @callback: the function to call when the policy is reloaded - * - * This sets the function callback function that will update the rules - * upon policy reloads. This callback should rebuild all existing rules - * using selinux_audit_rule_init(). - */ -void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void)); - -/** - * selinux_sid_to_string - map a security context ID to a string - * @sid: security context ID to be converted. - * @ctx: address of context string to be returned - * @ctxlen: length of returned context string. - * - * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the context - * string will be allocated internally, and the caller must call - * kfree() on it after use. - */ -int selinux_sid_to_string(u32 sid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen); - -/** - * selinux_get_inode_sid - get the inode's security context ID - * @inode: inode structure to get the sid from. - * @sid: pointer to security context ID to be filled in. - * - * Returns nothing - */ -void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid); - -/** - * selinux_get_ipc_sid - get the ipc security context ID - * @ipcp: ipc structure to get the sid from. - * @sid: pointer to security context ID to be filled in. - * - * Returns nothing - */ -void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *sid); - -/** - * selinux_get_task_sid - return the SID of task - * @tsk: the task whose SID will be returned - * @sid: pointer to security context ID to be filled in. - * - * Returns nothing - */ -void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid); - -/** * selinux_string_to_sid - map a security context string to a security ID * @str: the security context string to be mapped * @sid: ID value returned via this. @@ -151,52 +63,6 @@ void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void); void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void); #else -static inline int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, - char *rulestr, - struct selinux_audit_rule **rule) -{ - return -EOPNOTSUPP; -} - -static inline void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule) -{ - return; -} - -static inline int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, - struct selinux_audit_rule *rule, - struct audit_context *actx) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void)) -{ - return; -} - -static inline int selinux_sid_to_string(u32 sid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) -{ - *ctx = NULL; - *ctxlen = 0; - return 0; -} - -static inline void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid) -{ - *sid = 0; -} - -static inline void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *sid) -{ - *sid = 0; -} - -static inline void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid) -{ - *sid = 0; -} - static inline int selinux_string_to_sid(const char *str, u32 *sid) { *sid = 0; diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index b782b046543d..a7b16086d36f 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ * * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com> * - * Goals: 1) Integrate fully with SELinux. + * Goals: 1) Integrate fully with Security Modules. * 2) Minimal run-time overhead: * a) Minimal when syscall auditing is disabled (audit_enable=0). * b) Small when syscall auditing is enabled and no audit record @@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ #include <net/netlink.h> #include <linux/skbuff.h> #include <linux/netlink.h> -#include <linux/selinux.h> #include <linux/inotify.h> #include <linux/freezer.h> #include <linux/tty.h> @@ -265,13 +264,13 @@ static int audit_log_config_change(char *function_name, int new, int old, char *ctx = NULL; u32 len; - rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len); + rc = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len); if (rc) { audit_log_format(ab, " sid=%u", sid); allow_changes = 0; /* Something weird, deny request */ } else { audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx); - kfree(ctx); + security_release_secctx(ctx, len); } } audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", allow_changes); @@ -550,12 +549,13 @@ static int audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type, audit_log_format(*ab, "user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u", pid, uid, auid); if (sid) { - rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len); + rc = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len); if (rc) audit_log_format(*ab, " ssid=%u", sid); - else + else { audit_log_format(*ab, " subj=%s", ctx); - kfree(ctx); + security_release_secctx(ctx, len); + } } return rc; @@ -758,18 +758,18 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) break; } case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO: - err = selinux_sid_to_string(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len); + err = security_secid_to_secctx(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len); if (err) return err; sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!sig_data) { - kfree(ctx); + security_release_secctx(ctx, len); return -ENOMEM; } sig_data->uid = audit_sig_uid; sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid; memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len); - kfree(ctx); + security_release_secctx(ctx, len); audit_send_reply(NETLINK_CB(skb).pid, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, 0, 0, sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len); kfree(sig_data); @@ -881,10 +881,6 @@ static int __init audit_init(void) audit_enabled = audit_default; audit_ever_enabled |= !!audit_default; - /* Register the callback with selinux. This callback will be invoked - * when a new policy is loaded. */ - selinux_audit_set_callback(&selinux_audit_rule_update); - audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "initialized"); #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h index 2554bd524fd1..3cfc54ee3e1f 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.h +++ b/kernel/audit.h @@ -65,34 +65,9 @@ struct audit_watch { struct list_head rules; /* associated rules */ }; -struct audit_field { - u32 type; - u32 val; - u32 op; - char *se_str; - struct selinux_audit_rule *se_rule; -}; - struct audit_tree; struct audit_chunk; -struct audit_krule { - int vers_ops; - u32 flags; - u32 listnr; - u32 action; - u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE]; - u32 buflen; /* for data alloc on list rules */ - u32 field_count; - char *filterkey; /* ties events to rules */ - struct audit_field *fields; - struct audit_field *arch_f; /* quick access to arch field */ - struct audit_field *inode_f; /* quick access to an inode field */ - struct audit_watch *watch; /* associated watch */ - struct audit_tree *tree; /* associated watched tree */ - struct list_head rlist; /* entry in audit_{watch,tree}.rules list */ -}; - struct audit_entry { struct list_head list; struct rcu_head rcu; diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 2f2914b7cc30..28fef6bf8534 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ #include <linux/netlink.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/inotify.h> -#include <linux/selinux.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include "audit.h" /* @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ * Synchronizes writes and blocking reads of audit's filterlist * data. Rcu is used to traverse the filterlist and access * contents of structs audit_entry, audit_watch and opaque - * selinux rules during filtering. If modified, these structures + * LSM rules during filtering. If modified, these structures * must be copied and replace their counterparts in the filterlist. * An audit_parent struct is not accessed during filtering, so may * be written directly provided audit_filter_mutex is held. @@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e) if (e->rule.fields) for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) { struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; - kfree(f->se_str); - selinux_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule); + kfree(f->lsm_str); + security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule); } kfree(e->rule.fields); kfree(e->rule.filterkey); @@ -554,8 +554,8 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, f->op = data->fieldflags[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS; f->type = data->fields[i]; f->val = data->values[i]; - f->se_str = NULL; - f->se_rule = NULL; + f->lsm_str = NULL; + f->lsm_rule = NULL; switch(f->type) { case AUDIT_PID: case AUDIT_UID: @@ -597,12 +597,12 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, goto exit_free; entry->rule.buflen += f->val; - err = selinux_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str, - &f->se_rule); + err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str, + (void **)&f->lsm_rule); /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (err == -EINVAL) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux " + printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM " "\'%s\' is invalid\n", str); err = 0; } @@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, kfree(str); goto exit_free; } else - f->se_str = str; + f->lsm_str = str; break; case AUDIT_WATCH: str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val); @@ -754,7 +754,7 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule) case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: data->buflen += data->values[i] = - audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->se_str); + audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->lsm_str); break; case AUDIT_WATCH: data->buflen += data->values[i] = @@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b) case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: - if (strcmp(a->fields[i].se_str, b->fields[i].se_str)) + if (strcmp(a->fields[i].lsm_str, b->fields[i].lsm_str)) return 1; break; case AUDIT_WATCH: @@ -862,28 +862,28 @@ out: return new; } -/* Duplicate selinux field information. The se_rule is opaque, so must be +/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be * re-initialized. */ -static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df, +static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df, struct audit_field *sf) { int ret = 0; - char *se_str; + char *lsm_str; - /* our own copy of se_str */ - se_str = kstrdup(sf->se_str, GFP_KERNEL); - if (unlikely(!se_str)) + /* our own copy of lsm_str */ + lsm_str = kstrdup(sf->lsm_str, GFP_KERNEL); + if (unlikely(!lsm_str)) return -ENOMEM; - df->se_str = se_str; + df->lsm_str = lsm_str; - /* our own (refreshed) copy of se_rule */ - ret = selinux_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str, - &df->se_rule); + /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */ + ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str, + (void **)&df->lsm_rule); /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (ret == -EINVAL) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux \'%s\' is " - "invalid\n", df->se_str); + printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is " + "invalid\n", df->lsm_str); ret = 0; } @@ -891,7 +891,7 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df, } /* Duplicate an audit rule. This will be a deep copy with the exception - * of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The selinux specific fields + * of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The LSM specific fields * will be updated in the copy. The point is to be able to replace the old * rule with the new rule in the filterlist, then free the old rule. * The rlist element is undefined; list manipulations are handled apart from @@ -930,7 +930,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old, new->tree = old->tree; memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount); - /* deep copy this information, updating the se_rule fields, because + /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */ for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) { switch (new->fields[i].type) { @@ -944,7 +944,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old, case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: - err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i], + err = audit_dupe_lsm_field(&new->fields[i], &old->fields[i]); break; case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: @@ -1515,11 +1515,12 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(uid_t loginuid, u32 sid, char *action, if (sid) { char *ctx = NULL; u32 len; - if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) + if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid); - else + else { audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx); - kfree(ctx); + security_release_secctx(ctx, len); + } } audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s rule key=", action); if (rule->filterkey) @@ -1761,38 +1762,12 @@ unlock_and_return: return result; } -/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields. Returns 1 if there - are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise. */ -static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux(struct audit_krule *rule) -{ - int i; - - for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { - struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; - switch (f->type) { - case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: - case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: - case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: - case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: - case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: - case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: - case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: - case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: - case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: - case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: - return 1; - } - } - - return 0; -} - -/* This function will re-initialize the se_rule field of all applicable rules. - * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain selinux +/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules. + * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM * specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the - * selinux field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the + * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the * updated rule. */ -int selinux_audit_rule_update(void) +int audit_update_lsm_rules(void) { struct audit_entry *entry, *n, *nentry; struct audit_watch *watch; @@ -1804,7 +1779,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_update(void) for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) { list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, n, &audit_filter_list[i], list) { - if (!audit_rule_has_selinux(&entry->rule)) + if (!security_audit_rule_known(&entry->rule)) continue; watch = entry->rule.watch; @@ -1815,7 +1790,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_update(void) * return value */ if (!err) err = PTR_ERR(nentry); - audit_panic("error updating selinux filters"); + audit_panic("error updating LSM filters"); if (watch) list_del(&entry->rule.rlist); list_del_rcu(&entry->list); diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 782262e4107d..56e56ed594a8 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/list.h> #include <linux/tty.h> -#include <linux/selinux.h> #include <linux/binfmts.h> #include <linux/highmem.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> @@ -528,14 +527,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, match for now to avoid losing information that may be wanted. An error message will also be logged upon error */ - if (f->se_rule) { + if (f->lsm_rule) { if (need_sid) { - selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &sid); + security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); need_sid = 0; } - result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, + result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, f->op, - f->se_rule, + f->lsm_rule, ctx); } break; @@ -546,18 +545,18 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR also applies here */ - if (f->se_rule) { + if (f->lsm_rule) { /* Find files that match */ if (name) { - result = selinux_audit_rule_match( + result = security_audit_rule_match( name->osid, f->type, f->op, - f->se_rule, ctx); + f->lsm_rule, ctx); } else if (ctx) { for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { - if (selinux_audit_rule_match( + if (security_audit_rule_match( ctx->names[j].osid, f->type, f->op, - f->se_rule, ctx)) { + f->lsm_rule, ctx)) { ++result; break; } @@ -570,7 +569,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, aux = aux->next) { if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) { struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux; - if (selinux_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) { + if (security_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, ctx)) { ++result; break; } @@ -885,11 +884,11 @@ void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) int error; u32 sid; - selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid); + security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); if (!sid) return; - error = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len); + error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len); if (error) { if (error != -EINVAL) goto error_path; @@ -897,7 +896,7 @@ void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) } audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx); - kfree(ctx); + security_release_secctx(ctx, len); return; error_path: @@ -941,7 +940,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, u32 sid, char *comm) { struct audit_buffer *ab; - char *s = NULL; + char *ctx = NULL; u32 len; int rc = 0; @@ -951,15 +950,16 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid, uid, sessionid); - if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &s, &len)) { + if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) { audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)"); rc = 1; - } else - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", s); + } else { + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); + security_release_secctx(ctx, len); + } audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm); audit_log_end(ab); - kfree(s); return rc; } @@ -1271,14 +1271,15 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts if (axi->osid != 0) { char *ctx = NULL; u32 len; - if (selinux_sid_to_string( + if (security_secid_to_secctx( axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) { audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", axi->osid); call_panic = 1; - } else + } else { audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); - kfree(ctx); + security_release_secctx(ctx, len); + } } break; } @@ -1392,13 +1393,14 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts if (n->osid != 0) { char *ctx = NULL; u32 len; - if (selinux_sid_to_string( + if (security_secid_to_secctx( n->osid, &ctx, &len)) { audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid); call_panic = 2; - } else + } else { audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); - kfree(ctx); + security_release_secctx(ctx, len); + } } audit_log_end(ab); @@ -1775,7 +1777,7 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct inode *inode name->uid = inode->i_uid; name->gid = inode->i_gid; name->rdev = inode->i_rdev; - selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, &name->osid); + security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid); } /** @@ -2190,8 +2192,7 @@ int __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) ax->uid = ipcp->uid; ax->gid = ipcp->gid; ax->mode = ipcp->mode; - selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, &ax->osid); - + security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &ax->osid); ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC; ax->d.next = context->aux; context->aux = (void *)ax; @@ -2343,7 +2344,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); context->target_uid = t->uid; context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); - selinux_get_task_sid(t, &context->target_sid); + security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); } @@ -2371,7 +2372,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid; else audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid; - selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid); + security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid); } if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) return 0; @@ -2384,7 +2385,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); ctx->target_uid = t->uid; ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); - selinux_get_task_sid(t, &ctx->target_sid); + security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); return 0; } @@ -2405,7 +2406,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t->uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); - selinux_get_task_sid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); + security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); axp->pid_count++; @@ -2435,16 +2436,17 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr) ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND); audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u", auid, current->uid, current->gid, sessionid); - selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid); + security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); if (sid) { char *ctx = NULL; u32 len; - if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) + if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid); - else + else { audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx); - kfree(ctx); + security_release_secctx(ctx, len); + } } audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm); diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c index 36f75d873898..46f3e44bb83a 100644 --- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c +++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c @@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/audit.h> -#include <linux/selinux.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> @@ -1249,7 +1248,7 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock, NETLINK_CB(skb).pid = nlk->pid; NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = dst_group; NETLINK_CB(skb).loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); - selinux_get_task_sid(current, &(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid)); + security_task_getsecid(current, &(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid)); memcpy(NETLINK_CREDS(skb), &siocb->scm->creds, sizeof(struct ucred)); /* What can I do? Netlink is asynchronous, so that diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c index 480366f9c41d..98d5f969cdc8 100644 --- a/security/dummy.c +++ b/security/dummy.c @@ -424,6 +424,11 @@ static int dummy_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t bu return 0; } +static void dummy_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) +{ + *secid = 0; +} + static int dummy_file_permission (struct file *file, int mask) { return 0; @@ -542,7 +547,9 @@ static int dummy_task_getsid (struct task_struct *p) } static void dummy_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) -{ } +{ + *secid = 0; +} static int dummy_task_setgroups (struct group_info *group_info) { @@ -616,6 +623,11 @@ static int dummy_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) return 0; } +static void dummy_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) +{ + *secid = 0; +} + static int dummy_msg_msg_alloc_security (struct msg_msg *msg) { return 0; @@ -983,7 +995,33 @@ static inline int dummy_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, } #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ -struct security_operations dummy_security_ops; +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT +static inline int dummy_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, + void **lsmrule) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int dummy_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int dummy_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, + void *lsmrule, + struct audit_context *actx) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void dummy_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) +{ } + +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ + +struct security_operations dummy_security_ops = { + .name = "dummy", +}; #define set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, function) \ do { \ @@ -1060,6 +1098,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops) set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getsecurity); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_setsecurity); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_listsecurity); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getsecid); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_permission); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_free_security); @@ -1096,6 +1135,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops) set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_reparent_to_init); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_to_inode); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_permission); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_getsecid); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_alloc_security); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_free_security); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_alloc_security); @@ -1170,6 +1210,11 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops) set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_free); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_permission); #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ - +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_init); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_known); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_match); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_free); +#endif } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 54affd0ce6ad..2e250c7028eb 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/security.h> +/* Boot-time LSM user choice */ +static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1]; /* things that live in dummy.c */ extern struct security_operations dummy_security_ops; @@ -67,13 +69,47 @@ int __init security_init(void) return 0; } +/* Save user chosen LSM */ +static int __init choose_lsm(char *str) +{ + strncpy(chosen_lsm, str, SECURITY_NAME_MAX); + return 1; +} +__setup("security=", choose_lsm); + +/** + * security_module_enable - Load given security module on boot ? + * @ops: a pointer to the struct security_operations that is to be checked. + * + * Each LSM must pass this method before registering its own operations + * to avoid security registration races. This method may also be used + * to check if your LSM is currently loaded during kernel initialization. + * + * Return true if: + * -The passed LSM is the one chosen by user at boot time, + * -or user didsn't specify a specific LSM and we're the first to ask + * for registeration permissoin, + * -or the passed LSM is currently loaded. + * Otherwise, return false. + */ +int __init security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops) +{ + if (!*chosen_lsm) + strncpy(chosen_lsm, ops->name, SECURITY_NAME_MAX); + else if (strncmp(ops->name, chosen_lsm, SECURITY_NAME_MAX)) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + /** * register_security - registers a security framework with the kernel * @ops: a pointer to the struct security_options that is to be registered * * This function is to allow a security module to register itself with the * kernel security subsystem. Some rudimentary checking is done on the @ops - * value passed to this function. + * value passed to this function. You'll need to check first if your LSM + * is allowed to register its @ops by calling security_module_enable(@ops). * * If there is already a security module registered with the kernel, * an error will be returned. Otherwise 0 is returned on success. @@ -523,6 +559,11 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer return security_ops->inode_listsecurity(inode, buffer, buffer_size); } +void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) +{ + security_ops->inode_getsecid(inode, secid); +} + int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) { return security_ops->file_permission(file, mask); @@ -712,6 +753,11 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) return security_ops->ipc_permission(ipcp, flag); } +void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) +{ + security_ops->ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid); +} + int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg) { return security_ops->msg_msg_alloc_security(msg); @@ -1111,3 +1157,28 @@ int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, } #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) +{ + return security_ops->audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); +} + +int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) +{ + return security_ops->audit_rule_known(krule); +} + +void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) +{ + security_ops->audit_rule_free(lsmrule); +} + +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule, + struct audit_context *actx) +{ + return security_ops->audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, lsmrule, actx); +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c index 87d2bb3ea355..64af2d3409ef 100644 --- a/security/selinux/exports.c +++ b/security/selinux/exports.c @@ -25,48 +25,6 @@ /* SECMARK reference count */ extern atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount; -int selinux_sid_to_string(u32 sid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) -{ - if (selinux_enabled) - return security_sid_to_context(sid, ctx, ctxlen); - else { - *ctx = NULL; - *ctxlen = 0; - } - - return 0; -} - -void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid) -{ - if (selinux_enabled) { - struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; - *sid = isec->sid; - return; - } - *sid = 0; -} - -void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *sid) -{ - if (selinux_enabled) { - struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security; - *sid = isec->sid; - return; - } - *sid = 0; -} - -void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid) -{ - if (selinux_enabled) { - struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security; - *sid = tsec->sid; - return; - } - *sid = 0; -} - int selinux_string_to_sid(char *str, u32 *sid) { if (selinux_enabled) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 34f2d46c7984..f9927f02bc3d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ #include "netport.h" #include "xfrm.h" #include "netlabel.h" +#include "audit.h" #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX @@ -2792,6 +2793,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry); } +static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) +{ + struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; + *secid = isec->sid; +} + /* file security operations */ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) @@ -3183,7 +3190,8 @@ static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) { - selinux_get_task_sid(p, secid); + struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security; + *secid = tsec->sid; } static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info) @@ -4149,7 +4157,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff * goto out; if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) - selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid); + selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid); else if (skb) selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid); @@ -5026,6 +5034,12 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av); } +static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) +{ + struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security; + *secid = isec->sid; +} + /* module stacking operations */ static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops) { @@ -5281,6 +5295,8 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, #endif static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { + .name = "selinux", + .ptrace = selinux_ptrace, .capget = selinux_capget, .capset_check = selinux_capset_check, @@ -5342,6 +5358,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity, .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv, .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv, + .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid, .file_permission = selinux_file_permission, .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security, @@ -5382,6 +5399,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode, .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission, + .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid, .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security, .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security, @@ -5463,12 +5481,24 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .key_free = selinux_key_free, .key_permission = selinux_key_permission, #endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT + .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init, + .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known, + .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match, + .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free, +#endif }; static __init int selinux_init(void) { struct task_security_struct *tsec; + if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) { + selinux_enabled = 0; + return 0; + } + if (!selinux_enabled) { printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n"); return 0; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6c8b9ef15579 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +/* + * SELinux support for the Audit LSM hooks + * + * Most of below header was moved from include/linux/selinux.h which + * is released under below copyrights: + * + * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> + * + * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> + * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> + * Copyright (C) 2006 IBM Corporation, Timothy R. Chavez <tinytim@us.ibm.com> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, + * as published by the Free Software Foundation. + */ + +#ifndef _SELINUX_AUDIT_H +#define _SELINUX_AUDIT_H + +/** + * selinux_audit_rule_init - alloc/init an selinux audit rule structure. + * @field: the field this rule refers to + * @op: the operater the rule uses + * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule + * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this + * + * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure + * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with + * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use. + */ +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule); + +/** + * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure. + * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to be freed + * + * This will free all memory associated with the given rule. + * If @rule is NULL, no operation is performed. + */ +void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule); + +/** + * selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule. + * @sid: the context ID to check + * @field: the field this rule refers to + * @op: the operater the rule uses + * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against + * @actx: the audit context (can be NULL) associated with the check + * + * Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and + * -errno on failure. + */ +int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule, + struct audit_context *actx); + +/** + * selinux_audit_rule_known - check to see if rule contains selinux fields. + * @rule: rule to be checked + * Returns 1 if there are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise. + */ +int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule); + +#endif /* _SELINUX_AUDIT_H */ + diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 33425b1ac8d6..b341b8fd8c7c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ #include "netlabel.h" #include "xfrm.h" #include "ebitmap.h" +#include "audit.h" extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno); unsigned int policydb_loaded_version; @@ -2296,21 +2297,23 @@ struct selinux_audit_rule { struct context au_ctxt; }; -void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule) +void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) { + struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule; + if (rule) { context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt); kfree(rule); } } -int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - struct selinux_audit_rule **rule) +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) { struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule; struct role_datum *roledatum; struct type_datum *typedatum; struct user_datum *userdatum; + struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule; int rc = 0; *rule = NULL; @@ -2397,12 +2400,37 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, return rc; } -int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, - struct selinux_audit_rule *rule, +/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */ +int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { + struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; + switch (f->type) { + case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: + case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: + case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: + case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: + case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: + case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule, struct audit_context *actx) { struct context *ctxt; struct mls_level *level; + struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule; int match = 0; if (!rule) { @@ -2509,7 +2537,7 @@ out: return match; } -static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = NULL; +static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules; static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained) @@ -2534,11 +2562,6 @@ static int __init aurule_init(void) } __initcall(aurule_init); -void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void)) -{ - aurule_callback = callback; -} - #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL /** * security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index 62c1e982849d..4a4477f5afdc 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> /* @@ -187,6 +188,7 @@ extern struct smack_known smack_known_star; extern struct smack_known smack_known_unset; extern struct smk_list_entry *smack_list; +extern struct security_operations smack_ops; /* * Stricly for CIPSO level manipulation. diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index e2d6f7cd9254..93f5b0ce662a 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -2424,7 +2424,9 @@ static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) { } -static struct security_operations smack_ops = { +struct security_operations smack_ops = { + .name = "smack", + .ptrace = smack_ptrace, .capget = cap_capget, .capset_check = cap_capset_check, @@ -2557,6 +2559,9 @@ static struct security_operations smack_ops = { */ static __init int smack_init(void) { + if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops)) + return 0; + printk(KERN_INFO "Smack: Initializing.\n"); /* diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index cfae8afcc262..6ba283783b70 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -965,12 +965,21 @@ static struct vfsmount *smackfs_mount; * * register the smackfs * - * Returns 0 unless the registration fails. + * Do not register smackfs if Smack wasn't enabled + * on boot. We can not put this method normally under the + * smack_init() code path since the security subsystem get + * initialized before the vfs caches. + * + * Returns true if we were not chosen on boot or if + * we were chosen and filesystem registration succeeded. */ static int __init init_smk_fs(void) { int err; + if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops)) + return 0; + err = register_filesystem(&smk_fs_type); if (!err) { smackfs_mount = kern_mount(&smk_fs_type); |