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authorGravatar Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> 2023-10-27 11:22:02 -0700
committerGravatar Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> 2023-11-14 08:01:04 -0500
commit8dd2eee9d526c30fccfe75da7ec5365c6476e510 (patch)
tree667e9cb285e792d63240df26908b4c9df498b1f2 /arch/x86/kvm/mmu
parentKVM: x86: Disallow hugepages when memory attributes are mixed (diff)
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KVM: x86/mmu: Handle page fault for private memory
Add support for resolving page faults on guest private memory for VMs that differentiate between "shared" and "private" memory. For such VMs, KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD memslots can include both fd-based private memory and hva-based shared memory, and KVM needs to map in the "correct" variant, i.e. KVM needs to map the gfn shared/private as appropriate based on the current state of the gfn's KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE flag. For AMD's SEV-SNP and Intel's TDX, the guest effectively gets to request shared vs. private via a bit in the guest page tables, i.e. what the guest wants may conflict with the current memory attributes. To support such "implicit" conversion requests, exit to user with KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT to forward the request to userspace. Add a new flag for memory faults, KVM_MEMORY_EXIT_FLAG_PRIVATE, to communicate whether the guest wants to map memory as shared vs. private. Like KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE, use bit 3 for flagging private memory so that KVM can use bits 0-2 for capturing RWX behavior if/when userspace needs such information, e.g. a likely user of KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT is to exit on missing mappings when handling guest page fault VM-Exits. In that case, userspace will want to know RWX information in order to correctly/precisely resolve the fault. Note, private memory *must* be backed by guest_memfd, i.e. shared mappings always come from the host userspace page tables, and private mappings always come from a guest_memfd instance. Co-developed-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Yu Zhang <yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Chao Peng <chao.p.peng@linux.intel.com> Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Reviewed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com> Tested-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com> Message-Id: <20231027182217.3615211-21-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kvm/mmu')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c101
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h1
2 files changed, 97 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index f5c6b0643645..754a5aaebee5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -3147,9 +3147,9 @@ out:
return level;
}
-int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,
- const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
- int max_level)
+static int __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,
+ const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+ gfn_t gfn, int max_level, bool is_private)
{
struct kvm_lpage_info *linfo;
int host_level;
@@ -3161,6 +3161,9 @@ int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,
break;
}
+ if (is_private)
+ return max_level;
+
if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K)
return PG_LEVEL_4K;
@@ -3168,6 +3171,16 @@ int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,
return min(host_level, max_level);
}
+int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,
+ const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
+ int max_level)
+{
+ bool is_private = kvm_slot_can_be_private(slot) &&
+ kvm_mem_is_private(kvm, gfn);
+
+ return __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(kvm, slot, gfn, max_level, is_private);
+}
+
void kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
{
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot = fault->slot;
@@ -3188,8 +3201,9 @@ void kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault
* Enforce the iTLB multihit workaround after capturing the requested
* level, which will be used to do precise, accurate accounting.
*/
- fault->req_level = kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(vcpu->kvm, slot,
- fault->gfn, fault->max_level);
+ fault->req_level = __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(vcpu->kvm, slot,
+ fault->gfn, fault->max_level,
+ fault->is_private);
if (fault->req_level == PG_LEVEL_4K || fault->huge_page_disallowed)
return;
@@ -4269,6 +4283,55 @@ void kvm_arch_async_page_ready(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_async_pf *work)
kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(vcpu, work->cr2_or_gpa, 0, true, NULL);
}
+static inline u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order)
+{
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL > PG_LEVEL_1G);
+
+ KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(order != KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_1G) &&
+ order != KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_2M) &&
+ order != KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_4K));
+
+ if (order >= KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_1G))
+ return PG_LEVEL_1G;
+
+ if (order >= KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_2M))
+ return PG_LEVEL_2M;
+
+ return PG_LEVEL_4K;
+}
+
+static void kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
+{
+ kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault->gfn << PAGE_SHIFT,
+ PAGE_SIZE, fault->write, fault->exec,
+ fault->is_private);
+}
+
+static int kvm_faultin_pfn_private(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
+{
+ int max_order, r;
+
+ if (!kvm_slot_can_be_private(fault->slot)) {
+ kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ r = kvm_gmem_get_pfn(vcpu->kvm, fault->slot, fault->gfn, &fault->pfn,
+ &max_order);
+ if (r) {
+ kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault);
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ fault->max_level = min(kvm_max_level_for_order(max_order),
+ fault->max_level);
+ fault->map_writable = !(fault->slot->flags & KVM_MEM_READONLY);
+
+ return RET_PF_CONTINUE;
+}
+
static int __kvm_faultin_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
{
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot = fault->slot;
@@ -4301,6 +4364,14 @@ static int __kvm_faultin_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault
return RET_PF_EMULATE;
}
+ if (fault->is_private != kvm_mem_is_private(vcpu->kvm, fault->gfn)) {
+ kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ if (fault->is_private)
+ return kvm_faultin_pfn_private(vcpu, fault);
+
async = false;
fault->pfn = __gfn_to_pfn_memslot(slot, fault->gfn, false, false, &async,
fault->write, &fault->map_writable,
@@ -7188,6 +7259,26 @@ void kvm_mmu_pre_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
+bool kvm_arch_pre_set_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_gfn_range *range)
+{
+ /*
+ * Zap SPTEs even if the slot can't be mapped PRIVATE. KVM x86 only
+ * supports KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE, and so it *seems* like KVM
+ * can simply ignore such slots. But if userspace is making memory
+ * PRIVATE, then KVM must prevent the guest from accessing the memory
+ * as shared. And if userspace is making memory SHARED and this point
+ * is reached, then at least one page within the range was previously
+ * PRIVATE, i.e. the slot's possible hugepage ranges are changing.
+ * Zapping SPTEs in this case ensures KVM will reassess whether or not
+ * a hugepage can be used for affected ranges.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm)))
+ return false;
+
+ return kvm_unmap_gfn_range(kvm, range);
+}
+
static bool hugepage_test_mixed(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
int level)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
index decc1f153669..86c7cb692786 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
@@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ struct kvm_page_fault {
/* Derived from mmu and global state. */
const bool is_tdp;
+ const bool is_private;
const bool nx_huge_page_workaround_enabled;
/*