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authorGravatar Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> 2022-05-23 17:38:01 -0700
committerGravatar Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> 2022-05-23 17:38:01 -0700
commiteb39e37d5cebdf0f63ee2a315fc23b035d81b4b0 (patch)
treed048fa940dc1212e90a1f39de010e6fd2af650e6 /arch/x86/kvm
parentMerge tag 'edac_updates_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/... (diff)
parentx86/entry: Fixup objtool/ibt validation (diff)
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Merge tag 'x86_sev_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull AMD SEV-SNP support from Borislav Petkov: "The third AMD confidential computing feature called Secure Nested Paging. Add to confidential guests the necessary memory integrity protection against malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data replay, memory remapping and others, thus achieving a stronger isolation from the hypervisor. At the core of the functionality is a new structure called a reverse map table (RMP) with which the guest has a say in which pages get assigned to it and gets notified when a page which it owns, gets accessed/modified under the covers so that the guest can take an appropriate action. In addition, add support for the whole machinery needed to launch a SNP guest, details of which is properly explained in each patch. And last but not least, the series refactors and improves parts of the previous SEV support so that the new code is accomodated properly and not just bolted on" * tag 'x86_sev_for_v5.19_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (60 commits) x86/entry: Fixup objtool/ibt validation x86/sev: Mark the code returning to user space as syscall gap x86/sev: Annotate stack change in the #VC handler x86/sev: Remove duplicated assignment to variable info x86/sev: Fix address space sparse warning x86/sev: Get the AP jump table address from secrets page x86/sev: Add missing __init annotations to SEV init routines virt: sevguest: Rename the sevguest dir and files to sev-guest virt: sevguest: Change driver name to reflect generic SEV support x86/boot: Put globals that are accessed early into the .data section x86/boot: Add an efi.h header for the decompressor virt: sevguest: Fix bool function returning negative value virt: sevguest: Fix return value check in alloc_shared_pages() x86/sev-es: Replace open-coded hlt-loop with sev_es_terminate() virt: sevguest: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver x86/sev: Register SEV-SNP guest request platform device x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs ...
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kvm')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c19
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c22
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h4
4 files changed, 19 insertions, 34 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index 0c1ba6aa0765..de6d44e07e34 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <asm/user.h>
#include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
#include <asm/sgx.h>
+#include <asm/cpuid.h>
#include "cpuid.h"
#include "lapic.h"
#include "mmu.h"
@@ -744,24 +745,8 @@ static struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *do_host_cpuid(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array,
cpuid_count(entry->function, entry->index,
&entry->eax, &entry->ebx, &entry->ecx, &entry->edx);
- switch (function) {
- case 4:
- case 7:
- case 0xb:
- case 0xd:
- case 0xf:
- case 0x10:
- case 0x12:
- case 0x14:
- case 0x17:
- case 0x18:
- case 0x1d:
- case 0x1e:
- case 0x1f:
- case 0x8000001d:
+ if (cpuid_function_is_indexed(function))
entry->flags |= KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX;
- break;
- }
return entry;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 7c392873626f..636c77ef55fc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -562,12 +562,20 @@ e_unpin:
static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
- struct vmcb_save_area *save = &svm->vmcb->save;
+ struct sev_es_save_area *save = svm->sev_es.vmsa;
/* Check some debug related fields before encrypting the VMSA */
- if (svm->vcpu.guest_debug || (save->dr7 & ~DR7_FIXED_1))
+ if (svm->vcpu.guest_debug || (svm->vmcb->save.dr7 & ~DR7_FIXED_1))
return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * SEV-ES will use a VMSA that is pointed to by the VMCB, not
+ * the traditional VMSA that is part of the VMCB. Copy the
+ * traditional VMSA as it has been built so far (in prep
+ * for LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA) to be the initial SEV-ES state.
+ */
+ memcpy(save, &svm->vmcb->save, sizeof(svm->vmcb->save));
+
/* Sync registgers */
save->rax = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
save->rbx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
@@ -595,14 +603,6 @@ static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
save->xss = svm->vcpu.arch.ia32_xss;
save->dr6 = svm->vcpu.arch.dr6;
- /*
- * SEV-ES will use a VMSA that is pointed to by the VMCB, not
- * the traditional VMSA that is part of the VMCB. Copy the
- * traditional VMSA as it has been built so far (in prep
- * for LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA) to be the initial SEV-ES state.
- */
- memcpy(svm->sev_es.vmsa, save, sizeof(*save));
-
return 0;
}
@@ -2966,7 +2966,7 @@ void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
sev_enc_bit));
}
-void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct vmcb_save_area *hostsa)
+void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa)
{
/*
* As an SEV-ES guest, hardware will restore the host state on VMEXIT,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 7e45d03cd018..17d334ef5430 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -1270,8 +1270,8 @@ static void svm_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
*/
vmsave(__sme_page_pa(sd->save_area));
if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
- struct vmcb_save_area *hostsa;
- hostsa = (struct vmcb_save_area *)(page_address(sd->save_area) + 0x400);
+ struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa;
+ hostsa = (struct sev_es_save_area *)(page_address(sd->save_area) + 0x400);
sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(hostsa);
}
@@ -3117,8 +3117,8 @@ static void dump_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
"tr:",
save01->tr.selector, save01->tr.attrib,
save01->tr.limit, save01->tr.base);
- pr_err("cpl: %d efer: %016llx\n",
- save->cpl, save->efer);
+ pr_err("vmpl: %d cpl: %d efer: %016llx\n",
+ save->vmpl, save->cpl, save->efer);
pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
"cr0:", save->cr0, "cr2:", save->cr2);
pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index f76deff71002..2d83845b9032 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ struct svm_nested_state {
struct vcpu_sev_es_state {
/* SEV-ES support */
- struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa;
+ struct sev_es_save_area *vmsa;
struct ghcb *ghcb;
struct kvm_host_map ghcb_map;
bool received_first_sipi;
@@ -622,7 +622,7 @@ int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in);
void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector);
-void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct vmcb_save_area *hostsa);
+void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa);
void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
/* vmenter.S */