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author | 2024-02-27 10:09:49 +0100 | |
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committer | 2024-02-27 10:09:49 +0100 | |
commit | 9b9c280b9af2aa851d83e7d0b79f36a3d869d745 (patch) | |
tree | b61cf8566669d9615234e87696a833ee487e2655 /arch/x86 | |
parent | x86/apic: Build the x86 topology enumeration functions on UP APIC builds too (diff) | |
parent | x86/bugs: Use fixed addressing for VERW operand (diff) | |
download | linux-9b9c280b9af2aa851d83e7d0b79f36a3d869d745.tar.gz linux-9b9c280b9af2aa851d83e7d0b79f36a3d869d745.tar.bz2 linux-9b9c280b9af2aa851d83e7d0b79f36a3d869d745.zip |
Merge branch 'x86/urgent' into x86/apic, to resolve conflicts
Conflicts:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/Makefile | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/entry/entry.S | 23 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 25 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 15 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 178 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 20 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 20 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c | 23 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/xen/smp.c | 12 |
19 files changed, 221 insertions, 146 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile index 2264db14a25d..da8f3caf2781 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/Makefile @@ -112,13 +112,13 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_32),y) # temporary until string.h is fixed KBUILD_CFLAGS += -ffreestanding - ifeq ($(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR),y) - ifeq ($(CONFIG_SMP),y) + ifeq ($(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR),y) + ifeq ($(CONFIG_SMP),y) KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mstack-protector-guard-reg=fs -mstack-protector-guard-symbol=__stack_chk_guard - else + else KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mstack-protector-guard=global - endif endif + endif else BITS := 64 UTS_MACHINE := x86_64 diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry.S index 8c8d38f0cb1d..003379049924 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry.S @@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/linkage.h> #include <asm/msr-index.h> +#include <asm/unwind_hints.h> +#include <asm/segment.h> +#include <asm/cache.h> .pushsection .noinstr.text, "ax" @@ -20,3 +23,23 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(entry_ibpb) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(entry_ibpb); .popsection + +/* + * Define the VERW operand that is disguised as entry code so that + * it can be referenced with KPTI enabled. This ensure VERW can be + * used late in exit-to-user path after page tables are switched. + */ +.pushsection .entry.text, "ax" + +.align L1_CACHE_BYTES, 0xcc +SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(mds_verw_sel) + UNWIND_HINT_UNDEFINED + ANNOTATE_NOENDBR + .word __KERNEL_DS +.align L1_CACHE_BYTES, 0xcc +SYM_CODE_END(mds_verw_sel); +/* For KVM */ +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_verw_sel); + +.popsection + diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S index c73047bf9f4b..fba427646805 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S @@ -885,6 +885,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(entry_SYSENTER_32) BUG_IF_WRONG_CR3 no_user_check=1 popfl popl %eax + CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS /* * Return back to the vDSO, which will pop ecx and edx. @@ -954,6 +955,7 @@ restore_all_switch_stack: /* Restore user state */ RESTORE_REGS pop=4 # skip orig_eax/error_code + CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS .Lirq_return: /* * ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE rely on IRET core serialization @@ -1146,6 +1148,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(asm_exc_nmi) /* Not on SYSENTER stack. */ call exc_nmi + CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS jmp .Lnmi_return .Lnmi_from_sysenter_stack: diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S index c40f89ab1b4c..9bb485977629 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S @@ -161,6 +161,7 @@ syscall_return_via_sysret: SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETQ_unsafe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ANNOTATE_NOENDBR swapgs + CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS sysretq SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETQ_end, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ANNOTATE_NOENDBR @@ -573,6 +574,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode, SYM_L_GLOBAL) .Lswapgs_and_iret: swapgs + CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS /* Assert that the IRET frame indicates user mode. */ testb $3, 8(%rsp) jnz .Lnative_iret @@ -723,6 +725,8 @@ native_irq_return_ldt: */ popq %rax /* Restore user RAX */ + CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS + /* * RSP now points to an ordinary IRET frame, except that the page * is read-only and RSP[31:16] are preloaded with the userspace @@ -1450,6 +1454,12 @@ nmi_restore: movq $0, 5*8(%rsp) /* clear "NMI executing" */ /* + * Skip CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS here, since it only helps in rare cases like + * NMI in kernel after user state is restored. For an unprivileged user + * these conditions are hard to meet. + */ + + /* * iretq reads the "iret" frame and exits the NMI stack in a * single instruction. We are returning to kernel mode, so this * cannot result in a fault. Similarly, we don't need to worry @@ -1466,6 +1476,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_SYSCALL32_ignore) UNWIND_HINT_END_OF_STACK ENDBR mov $-ENOSYS, %eax + CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS sysretl SYM_CODE_END(entry_SYSCALL32_ignore) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S index de94e2e84ecc..eabf48c4d4b4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S @@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETL_compat_unsafe_stack, SYM_L_GLOBAL) xorl %r9d, %r9d xorl %r10d, %r10d swapgs + CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS sysretl SYM_INNER_LABEL(entry_SYSRETL_compat_end, SYM_L_GLOBAL) ANNOTATE_NOENDBR diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index fdf723b6f6d0..2b62cdd8dd12 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_SYSENTER32 ( 3*32+15) /* "" sysenter in IA32 userspace */ #define X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD ( 3*32+16) /* REP microcode works well */ #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2 ( 3*32+17) /* AMD Last Branch Record Extension Version 2 */ -/* FREE, was #define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC ( 3*32+18) "" LFENCE synchronizes RDTSC */ +#define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF ( 3*32+18) /* "" Clear CPU buffers using VERW */ #define X86_FEATURE_ACC_POWER ( 3*32+19) /* AMD Accumulated Power Mechanism */ #define X86_FEATURE_NOPL ( 3*32+20) /* The NOPL (0F 1F) instructions */ #define X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS ( 3*32+21) /* "" Always-present feature */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h index ce8f50192ae3..7e523bb3d2d3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h @@ -91,7 +91,6 @@ static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs, static __always_inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode(void) { - mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(); amd_clear_divider(); } #define arch_exit_to_user_mode arch_exit_to_user_mode diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 262e65539f83..ab19c7f1167b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -315,6 +315,17 @@ #endif .endm +/* + * Macro to execute VERW instruction that mitigate transient data sampling + * attacks such as MDS. On affected systems a microcode update overloaded VERW + * instruction to also clear the CPU buffers. VERW clobbers CFLAGS.ZF. + * + * Note: Only the memory operand variant of VERW clears the CPU buffers. + */ +.macro CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS + ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(verw mds_verw_sel), X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF +.endm + #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE \ @@ -529,13 +540,14 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp); DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb); DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb); -DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear); DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear); DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush); DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear); +extern u16 mds_verw_sel; + #include <asm/segment.h> /** @@ -562,17 +574,6 @@ static __always_inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void) } /** - * mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability - * - * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled - */ -static __always_inline void mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(void) -{ - if (static_branch_likely(&mds_user_clear)) - mds_clear_cpu_buffers(); -} - -/** * mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability * * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index bb0ab8466b91..48d049cd74e7 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -111,9 +111,6 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb); /* Control unconditional IBPB in switch_mm() */ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb); -/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before returning to user space */ -DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear); -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_user_clear); /* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before idling (halt, mwait) */ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear); EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear); @@ -252,7 +249,7 @@ static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void) if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR)) mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV; - static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear); + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF); if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY) && (mds_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())) @@ -356,7 +353,7 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void) * For guests that can't determine whether the correct microcode is * present on host, enable the mitigation for UCODE_NEEDED as well. */ - static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear); + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF); if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()) cpu_smt_disable(false); @@ -424,7 +421,7 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void) */ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM))) - static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear); + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF); else static_branch_enable(&mmio_stale_data_clear); @@ -484,12 +481,12 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void) if (cpu_mitigations_off()) return; - if (!static_key_enabled(&mds_user_clear)) + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF)) goto out; /* - * mds_user_clear is now enabled. Update MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data - * mitigation, if necessary. + * X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF is now enabled. Update MDS, TAA and MMIO + * Stale Data mitigation, if necessary. */ if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF && boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) { diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index 05e0b31f75e9..087d21734286 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -1543,6 +1543,7 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) get_cpu_vendor(c); get_cpu_cap(c); setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CPUID); + get_cpu_address_sizes(c); cpu_parse_early_param(); cpu_init_topology(c); @@ -1557,11 +1558,10 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) this_cpu->c_bsp_init(c); } else { setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CPUID); + get_cpu_address_sizes(c); cpu_init_topology(c); } - get_cpu_address_sizes(c); - setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS); cpu_set_bug_bits(c); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c index 1bb37a69d837..be30d7fa2e66 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c @@ -184,6 +184,90 @@ static bool bad_spectre_microcode(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) return false; } +#define MSR_IA32_TME_ACTIVATE 0x982 + +/* Helpers to access TME_ACTIVATE MSR */ +#define TME_ACTIVATE_LOCKED(x) (x & 0x1) +#define TME_ACTIVATE_ENABLED(x) (x & 0x2) + +#define TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY(x) ((x >> 4) & 0xf) /* Bits 7:4 */ +#define TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY_AES_XTS_128 0 + +#define TME_ACTIVATE_KEYID_BITS(x) ((x >> 32) & 0xf) /* Bits 35:32 */ + +#define TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_ALGS(x) ((x >> 48) & 0xffff) /* Bits 63:48 */ +#define TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_AES_XTS_128 1 + +/* Values for mktme_status (SW only construct) */ +#define MKTME_ENABLED 0 +#define MKTME_DISABLED 1 +#define MKTME_UNINITIALIZED 2 +static int mktme_status = MKTME_UNINITIALIZED; + +static void detect_tme_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + u64 tme_activate, tme_policy, tme_crypto_algs; + int keyid_bits = 0, nr_keyids = 0; + static u64 tme_activate_cpu0 = 0; + + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_TME_ACTIVATE, tme_activate); + + if (mktme_status != MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) { + if (tme_activate != tme_activate_cpu0) { + /* Broken BIOS? */ + pr_err_once("x86/tme: configuration is inconsistent between CPUs\n"); + pr_err_once("x86/tme: MKTME is not usable\n"); + mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED; + + /* Proceed. We may need to exclude bits from x86_phys_bits. */ + } + } else { + tme_activate_cpu0 = tme_activate; + } + + if (!TME_ACTIVATE_LOCKED(tme_activate) || !TME_ACTIVATE_ENABLED(tme_activate)) { + pr_info_once("x86/tme: not enabled by BIOS\n"); + mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED; + return; + } + + if (mktme_status != MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) + goto detect_keyid_bits; + + pr_info("x86/tme: enabled by BIOS\n"); + + tme_policy = TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY(tme_activate); + if (tme_policy != TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY_AES_XTS_128) + pr_warn("x86/tme: Unknown policy is active: %#llx\n", tme_policy); + + tme_crypto_algs = TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_ALGS(tme_activate); + if (!(tme_crypto_algs & TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_AES_XTS_128)) { + pr_err("x86/mktme: No known encryption algorithm is supported: %#llx\n", + tme_crypto_algs); + mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED; + } +detect_keyid_bits: + keyid_bits = TME_ACTIVATE_KEYID_BITS(tme_activate); + nr_keyids = (1UL << keyid_bits) - 1; + if (nr_keyids) { + pr_info_once("x86/mktme: enabled by BIOS\n"); + pr_info_once("x86/mktme: %d KeyIDs available\n", nr_keyids); + } else { + pr_info_once("x86/mktme: disabled by BIOS\n"); + } + + if (mktme_status == MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) { + /* MKTME is usable */ + mktme_status = MKTME_ENABLED; + } + + /* + * KeyID bits effectively lower the number of physical address + * bits. Update cpuinfo_x86::x86_phys_bits accordingly. + */ + c->x86_phys_bits -= keyid_bits; +} + static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u64 misc_enable; @@ -315,6 +399,13 @@ static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) } check_memory_type_self_snoop_errata(c); + + /* + * Adjust the number of physical bits early because it affects the + * valid bits of the MTRR mask registers. + */ + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TME)) + detect_tme_early(c); } static void bsp_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) @@ -475,90 +566,6 @@ static void srat_detect_node(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) #endif } -#define MSR_IA32_TME_ACTIVATE 0x982 - -/* Helpers to access TME_ACTIVATE MSR */ -#define TME_ACTIVATE_LOCKED(x) (x & 0x1) -#define TME_ACTIVATE_ENABLED(x) (x & 0x2) - -#define TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY(x) ((x >> 4) & 0xf) /* Bits 7:4 */ -#define TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY_AES_XTS_128 0 - -#define TME_ACTIVATE_KEYID_BITS(x) ((x >> 32) & 0xf) /* Bits 35:32 */ - -#define TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_ALGS(x) ((x >> 48) & 0xffff) /* Bits 63:48 */ -#define TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_AES_XTS_128 1 - -/* Values for mktme_status (SW only construct) */ -#define MKTME_ENABLED 0 -#define MKTME_DISABLED 1 -#define MKTME_UNINITIALIZED 2 -static int mktme_status = MKTME_UNINITIALIZED; - -static void detect_tme(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) -{ - u64 tme_activate, tme_policy, tme_crypto_algs; - int keyid_bits = 0, nr_keyids = 0; - static u64 tme_activate_cpu0 = 0; - - rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_TME_ACTIVATE, tme_activate); - - if (mktme_status != MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) { - if (tme_activate != tme_activate_cpu0) { - /* Broken BIOS? */ - pr_err_once("x86/tme: configuration is inconsistent between CPUs\n"); - pr_err_once("x86/tme: MKTME is not usable\n"); - mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED; - - /* Proceed. We may need to exclude bits from x86_phys_bits. */ - } - } else { - tme_activate_cpu0 = tme_activate; - } - - if (!TME_ACTIVATE_LOCKED(tme_activate) || !TME_ACTIVATE_ENABLED(tme_activate)) { - pr_info_once("x86/tme: not enabled by BIOS\n"); - mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED; - return; - } - - if (mktme_status != MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) - goto detect_keyid_bits; - - pr_info("x86/tme: enabled by BIOS\n"); - - tme_policy = TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY(tme_activate); - if (tme_policy != TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY_AES_XTS_128) - pr_warn("x86/tme: Unknown policy is active: %#llx\n", tme_policy); - - tme_crypto_algs = TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_ALGS(tme_activate); - if (!(tme_crypto_algs & TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_AES_XTS_128)) { - pr_err("x86/mktme: No known encryption algorithm is supported: %#llx\n", - tme_crypto_algs); - mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED; - } -detect_keyid_bits: - keyid_bits = TME_ACTIVATE_KEYID_BITS(tme_activate); - nr_keyids = (1UL << keyid_bits) - 1; - if (nr_keyids) { - pr_info_once("x86/mktme: enabled by BIOS\n"); - pr_info_once("x86/mktme: %d KeyIDs available\n", nr_keyids); - } else { - pr_info_once("x86/mktme: disabled by BIOS\n"); - } - - if (mktme_status == MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) { - /* MKTME is usable */ - mktme_status = MKTME_ENABLED; - } - - /* - * KeyID bits effectively lower the number of physical address - * bits. Update cpuinfo_x86::x86_phys_bits accordingly. - */ - c->x86_phys_bits -= keyid_bits; -} - static void init_cpuid_fault(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u64 msr; @@ -677,9 +684,6 @@ static void init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) init_ia32_feat_ctl(c); - if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TME)) - detect_tme(c); - init_intel_misc_features(c); split_lock_init(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c index 17e955ab69fe..3082cf24b69e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c @@ -563,9 +563,6 @@ nmi_restart: } if (this_cpu_dec_return(nmi_state)) goto nmi_restart; - - if (user_mode(regs)) - mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(); } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c index a6216c874729..315c7c2ba89b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static int fixed_pmc_events[] = { static void reprogram_fixed_counters(struct kvm_pmu *pmu, u64 data) { struct kvm_pmc *pmc; - u8 old_fixed_ctr_ctrl = pmu->fixed_ctr_ctrl; + u64 old_fixed_ctr_ctrl = pmu->fixed_ctr_ctrl; int i; pmu->fixed_ctr_ctrl = data; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h index edc3f16cc189..6a9bfdfbb6e5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/run_flags.h @@ -2,7 +2,10 @@ #ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H #define __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H -#define VMX_RUN_VMRESUME (1 << 0) -#define VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL (1 << 1) +#define VMX_RUN_VMRESUME_SHIFT 0 +#define VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL_SHIFT 1 + +#define VMX_RUN_VMRESUME BIT(VMX_RUN_VMRESUME_SHIFT) +#define VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL BIT(VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL_SHIFT) #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S index 906ecd001511..2bfbf758d061 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) mov (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_AX /* Check if vmlaunch or vmresume is needed */ - test $VMX_RUN_VMRESUME, %ebx + bt $VMX_RUN_VMRESUME_SHIFT, %ebx /* Load guest registers. Don't clobber flags. */ mov VCPU_RCX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_CX @@ -161,8 +161,11 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run) /* Load guest RAX. This kills the @regs pointer! */ mov VCPU_RAX(%_ASM_AX), %_ASM_AX - /* Check EFLAGS.ZF from 'test VMX_RUN_VMRESUME' above */ - jz .Lvmlaunch + /* Clobbers EFLAGS.ZF */ + CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS + + /* Check EFLAGS.CF from the VMX_RUN_VMRESUME bit test above. */ + jnc .Lvmlaunch /* * After a successful VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH, control flow "magically" diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 1111d9d08903..88a4ff200d04 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -388,7 +388,16 @@ static __always_inline void vmx_enable_fb_clear(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) static void vmx_update_fb_clear_dis(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) { - vmx->disable_fb_clear = (host_arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL) && + /* + * Disable VERW's behavior of clearing CPU buffers for the guest if the + * CPU isn't affected by MDS/TAA, and the host hasn't forcefully enabled + * the mitigation. Disabling the clearing behavior provides a + * performance boost for guests that aren't aware that manually clearing + * CPU buffers is unnecessary, at the cost of MSR accesses on VM-Entry + * and VM-Exit. + */ + vmx->disable_fb_clear = !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF) && + (host_arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL) && !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) && !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA); @@ -7224,11 +7233,14 @@ static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, guest_state_enter_irqoff(); - /* L1D Flush includes CPU buffer clear to mitigate MDS */ + /* + * L1D Flush includes CPU buffer clear to mitigate MDS, but VERW + * mitigation for MDS is done late in VMentry and is still + * executed in spite of L1D Flush. This is because an extra VERW + * should not matter much after the big hammer L1D Flush. + */ if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush)) vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu); - else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mds_user_clear)) - mds_clear_cpu_buffers(); else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mmio_stale_data_clear) && kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm)) mds_clear_cpu_buffers(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index bf10a9073a09..48a61d283406 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -1704,22 +1704,17 @@ static int do_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned index, u64 *data) struct kvm_msr_entry msr; int r; + /* Unconditionally clear the output for simplicity */ + msr.data = 0; msr.index = index; r = kvm_get_msr_feature(&msr); - if (r == KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID) { - /* Unconditionally clear the output for simplicity */ - *data = 0; - if (kvm_msr_ignored_check(index, 0, false)) - r = 0; - } - - if (r) - return r; + if (r == KVM_MSR_RET_INVALID && kvm_msr_ignored_check(index, 0, false)) + r = 0; *data = msr.data; - return 0; + return r; } static bool __kvm_valid_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer) @@ -2511,7 +2506,7 @@ static u64 compute_guest_tsc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, s64 kernel_ns) } #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 -static inline int gtod_is_based_on_tsc(int mode) +static inline bool gtod_is_based_on_tsc(int mode) { return mode == VDSO_CLOCKMODE_TSC || mode == VDSO_CLOCKMODE_HVCLOCK; } @@ -5458,7 +5453,8 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_vcpu_events(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, if (events->flags & KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_NMI_PENDING) { vcpu->arch.nmi_pending = 0; atomic_set(&vcpu->arch.nmi_queued, events->nmi.pending); - kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_NMI, vcpu); + if (events->nmi.pending) + kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_NMI, vcpu); } static_call(kvm_x86_set_nmi_mask)(vcpu, events->nmi.masked); diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c index 968d7005f4a7..f50cc210a981 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c @@ -26,18 +26,31 @@ static int ident_pud_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pud_t *pud_page, for (; addr < end; addr = next) { pud_t *pud = pud_page + pud_index(addr); pmd_t *pmd; + bool use_gbpage; next = (addr & PUD_MASK) + PUD_SIZE; if (next > end) next = end; - if (info->direct_gbpages) { - pud_t pudval; + /* if this is already a gbpage, this portion is already mapped */ + if (pud_large(*pud)) + continue; + + /* Is using a gbpage allowed? */ + use_gbpage = info->direct_gbpages; - if (pud_present(*pud)) - continue; + /* Don't use gbpage if it maps more than the requested region. */ + /* at the begining: */ + use_gbpage &= ((addr & ~PUD_MASK) == 0); + /* ... or at the end: */ + use_gbpage &= ((next & ~PUD_MASK) == 0); + + /* Never overwrite existing mappings */ + use_gbpage &= !pud_present(*pud); + + if (use_gbpage) { + pud_t pudval; - addr &= PUD_MASK; pudval = __pud((addr - info->offset) | info->page_flag); set_pud(pud, pudval); continue; diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/smp.c b/arch/x86/xen/smp.c index 114b362cb7af..935771726f9c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/smp.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/smp.c @@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ int xen_smp_intr_init(unsigned int cpu) char *resched_name, *callfunc_name, *debug_name; resched_name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "resched%d", cpu); + if (!resched_name) + goto fail_mem; per_cpu(xen_resched_irq, cpu).name = resched_name; rc = bind_ipi_to_irqhandler(XEN_RESCHEDULE_VECTOR, cpu, @@ -77,6 +79,8 @@ int xen_smp_intr_init(unsigned int cpu) per_cpu(xen_resched_irq, cpu).irq = rc; callfunc_name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "callfunc%d", cpu); + if (!callfunc_name) + goto fail_mem; per_cpu(xen_callfunc_irq, cpu).name = callfunc_name; rc = bind_ipi_to_irqhandler(XEN_CALL_FUNCTION_VECTOR, cpu, @@ -90,6 +94,9 @@ int xen_smp_intr_init(unsigned int cpu) if (!xen_fifo_events) { debug_name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "debug%d", cpu); + if (!debug_name) + goto fail_mem; + per_cpu(xen_debug_irq, cpu).name = debug_name; rc = bind_virq_to_irqhandler(VIRQ_DEBUG, cpu, xen_debug_interrupt, @@ -101,6 +108,9 @@ int xen_smp_intr_init(unsigned int cpu) } callfunc_name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "callfuncsingle%d", cpu); + if (!callfunc_name) + goto fail_mem; + per_cpu(xen_callfuncsingle_irq, cpu).name = callfunc_name; rc = bind_ipi_to_irqhandler(XEN_CALL_FUNCTION_SINGLE_VECTOR, cpu, @@ -114,6 +124,8 @@ int xen_smp_intr_init(unsigned int cpu) return 0; + fail_mem: + rc = -ENOMEM; fail: xen_smp_intr_free(cpu); return rc; |