diff options
author | 2020-09-15 20:53:13 -0700 | |
---|---|---|
committer | 2020-10-05 10:47:43 -0600 | |
commit | 07560151db960d26b425410d6fd778e6757a5da2 (patch) | |
tree | 2d8582959d8765348d923e745a187983f6c01aaf /drivers/md | |
parent | block: add a bdget_part helper (diff) | |
download | linux-07560151db960d26b425410d6fd778e6757a5da2.tar.gz linux-07560151db960d26b425410d6fd778e6757a5da2.tar.bz2 linux-07560151db960d26b425410d6fd778e6757a5da2.zip |
block: make bio_crypt_clone() able to fail
bio_crypt_clone() assumes its gfp_mask argument always includes
__GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM, so that the mempool_alloc() will always succeed.
However, bio_crypt_clone() might be called with GFP_ATOMIC via
setup_clone() in drivers/md/dm-rq.c, or with GFP_NOWAIT via
kcryptd_io_read() in drivers/md/dm-crypt.c.
Neither case is currently reachable with a bio that actually has an
encryption context. However, it's fragile to rely on this. Just make
bio_crypt_clone() able to fail, analogous to bio_integrity_clone().
Reported-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Cc: Satya Tangirala <satyat@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/md')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/md/dm.c | 7 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/md/dm.c b/drivers/md/dm.c index 59b0687f9235..e959cd74cd4b 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm.c @@ -1326,14 +1326,15 @@ static int clone_bio(struct dm_target_io *tio, struct bio *bio, sector_t sector, unsigned len) { struct bio *clone = &tio->clone; + int r; __bio_clone_fast(clone, bio); - bio_crypt_clone(clone, bio, GFP_NOIO); + r = bio_crypt_clone(clone, bio, GFP_NOIO); + if (r < 0) + return r; if (bio_integrity(bio)) { - int r; - if (unlikely(!dm_target_has_integrity(tio->ti->type) && !dm_target_passes_integrity(tio->ti->type))) { DMWARN("%s: the target %s doesn't support integrity data.", |