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author | 2013-04-22 02:20:42 +0000 | |
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committer | 2013-04-22 15:37:01 -0400 | |
commit | 2810e5b9a7731ca5fce22bfbe12c96e16ac44b6f (patch) | |
tree | 766b484584a4d28ecffa745f5a1cc21864abd099 /include | |
parent | xen-netfront: reduce gso_max_size to account for max TCP header (diff) | |
download | linux-2810e5b9a7731ca5fce22bfbe12c96e16ac44b6f.tar.gz linux-2810e5b9a7731ca5fce22bfbe12c96e16ac44b6f.tar.bz2 linux-2810e5b9a7731ca5fce22bfbe12c96e16ac44b6f.zip |
xen-netback: coalesce slots in TX path and fix regressions
This patch tries to coalesce tx requests when constructing grant copy
structures. It enables netback to deal with situation when frontend's
MAX_SKB_FRAGS is larger than backend's MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
With the help of coalescing, this patch tries to address two regressions
avoid reopening the security hole in XSA-39.
Regression 1. The reduction of the number of supported ring entries (slots)
per packet (from 18 to 17). This regression has been around for some time but
remains unnoticed until XSA-39 security fix. This is fixed by coalescing
slots.
Regression 2. The XSA-39 security fix turning "too many frags" errors from
just dropping the packet to a fatal error and disabling the VIF. This is fixed
by coalescing slots (handling 18 slots when backend's MAX_SKB_FRAGS is 17)
which rules out false positive (using 18 slots is legit) and dropping packets
using 19 to `max_skb_slots` slots.
To avoid reopening security hole in XSA-39, frontend sending packet using more
than max_skb_slots is considered malicious.
The behavior of netback for packet is thus:
1-18 slots: valid
19-max_skb_slots slots: drop and respond with an error
max_skb_slots+ slots: fatal error
max_skb_slots is configurable by admin, default value is 20.
Also change variable name from "frags" to "slots" in netbk_count_requests.
Please note that RX path still has dependency on MAX_SKB_FRAGS. This will be
fixed with separate patch.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'include')
-rw-r--r-- | include/xen/interface/io/netif.h | 18 |
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/xen/interface/io/netif.h b/include/xen/interface/io/netif.h index 58fadcac33a1..3ef3fe05ee99 100644 --- a/include/xen/interface/io/netif.h +++ b/include/xen/interface/io/netif.h @@ -13,6 +13,24 @@ #include <xen/interface/grant_table.h> /* + * Older implementation of Xen network frontend / backend has an + * implicit dependency on the MAX_SKB_FRAGS as the maximum number of + * ring slots a skb can use. Netfront / netback may not work as + * expected when frontend and backend have different MAX_SKB_FRAGS. + * + * A better approach is to add mechanism for netfront / netback to + * negotiate this value. However we cannot fix all possible + * frontends, so we need to define a value which states the minimum + * slots backend must support. + * + * The minimum value derives from older Linux kernel's MAX_SKB_FRAGS + * (18), which is proved to work with most frontends. Any new backend + * which doesn't negotiate with frontend should expect frontend to + * send a valid packet using slots up to this value. + */ +#define XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN 18 + +/* * Notifications after enqueuing any type of message should be conditional on * the appropriate req_event or rsp_event field in the shared ring. * If the client sends notification for rx requests then it should specify |