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authorGravatar Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> 2019-07-23 19:58:38 +0200
committerGravatar Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> 2019-08-06 18:08:25 +0100
commit2b835e24b5c6f9c633ff51973581ee7ca7b3e8ec (patch)
treef3de91fbb738cccbdcfdda3754765cbb3bd24e0e /kernel/sys.c
parentLinux 5.3-rc3 (diff)
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arm64: untag user pointers in access_ok and __uaccess_mask_ptr
This patch is a part of a series that extends kernel ABI to allow to pass tagged user pointers (with the top byte set to something else other than 0x00) as syscall arguments. copy_from_user (and a few other similar functions) are used to copy data from user memory into the kernel memory or vice versa. Since a user can provided a tagged pointer to one of the syscalls that use copy_from_user, we need to correctly handle such pointers. Do this by untagging user pointers in access_ok and in __uaccess_mask_ptr, before performing access validity checks. Note, that this patch only temporarily untags the pointers to perform the checks, but then passes them as is into the kernel internals. Reviewed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> [will: Add __force to casting in untagged_addr() to kill sparse warning] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/sys.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions