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author | 2013-03-24 14:28:27 -0700 | |
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committer | 2013-03-27 07:50:08 -0700 | |
commit | 87a8ebd637dafc255070f503909a053cf0d98d3f (patch) | |
tree | 0bc879f9118c3333c73dfd15223a79e6219f64fd /kernel | |
parent | ipc: Restrict mounting the mqueue filesystem (diff) | |
download | linux-87a8ebd637dafc255070f503909a053cf0d98d3f.tar.gz linux-87a8ebd637dafc255070f503909a053cf0d98d3f.tar.bz2 linux-87a8ebd637dafc255070f503909a053cf0d98d3f.zip |
userns: Restrict when proc and sysfs can be mounted
Only allow unprivileged mounts of proc and sysfs if they are already
mounted when the user namespace is created.
proc and sysfs are interesting because they have content that is
per namespace, and so fresh mounts are needed when new namespaces
are created while at the same time proc and sysfs have content that
is shared between every instance.
Respect the policy of who may see the shared content of proc and sysfs
by only allowing new mounts if there was an existing mount at the time
the user namespace was created.
In practice there are only two interesting cases: proc and sysfs are
mounted at their usual places, proc and sysfs are not mounted at all
(some form of mount namespace jail).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/user.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/user_namespace.c | 2 |
2 files changed, 4 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/user.c b/kernel/user.c index e81978e8c03b..8e635a18ab52 100644 --- a/kernel/user.c +++ b/kernel/user.c @@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ struct user_namespace init_user_ns = { .owner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .group = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, .proc_inum = PROC_USER_INIT_INO, + .may_mount_sysfs = true, + .may_mount_proc = true, }; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_user_ns); diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c index 0f1e42884577..a54f26f82eb2 100644 --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c @@ -96,6 +96,8 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new) set_cred_user_ns(new, ns); + update_mnt_policy(ns); + return 0; } |