diff options
author | 2012-07-23 18:49:06 -0700 | |
---|---|---|
committer | 2012-07-23 18:49:06 -0700 | |
commit | e05644e17e744315bce12b0948cdc36910b9a76e (patch) | |
tree | 92d62ff59c57f991ef6b5c3cc2c2dcd205946a11 /security | |
parent | Merge tag 'clk' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm/arm-soc (diff) | |
parent | Smack: Maintainer Record (diff) | |
download | linux-e05644e17e744315bce12b0948cdc36910b9a76e.tar.gz linux-e05644e17e744315bce12b0948cdc36910b9a76e.tar.bz2 linux-e05644e17e744315bce12b0948cdc36910b9a76e.zip |
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Nothing groundbreaking for this kernel, just cleanups and fixes, and a
couple of Smack enhancements."
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (21 commits)
Smack: Maintainer Record
Smack: don't show empty rules when /smack/load or /smack/load2 is read
Smack: user access check bounds
Smack: onlycap limits on CAP_MAC_ADMIN
Smack: fix smack_new_inode bogosities
ima: audit is compiled only when enabled
ima: ima_initialized is set only if successful
ima: add policy for pseudo fs
ima: remove unused cleanup functions
ima: free securityfs violations file
ima: use full pathnames in measurement list
security: Fix nommu build.
samples: seccomp: add .gitignore for untracked executables
tpm: check the chip reference before using it
TPM: fix memleak when register hardware fails
TPM: chip disabled state erronously being reported as error
MAINTAINERS: TPM maintainers' contacts update
Merge branches 'next-queue' and 'next' into next
Remove unused code from MPI library
Revert "crypto: GnuPG based MPI lib - additional sources (part 4)"
...
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 50 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/compat.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/internal.h | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/keyctl.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/keyring.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack.h | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_access.c | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 25 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smackfs.c | 53 |
17 files changed, 114 insertions, 87 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index 35664fe6daa1..b9c1219924f1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -38,8 +38,9 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX measurement list. If unsure, use the default 10. config IMA_AUDIT - bool + bool "Enables auditing support" depends on IMA + depends on AUDIT default y help This option adds a kernel parameter 'ima_audit', which diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile index 5690c021de8f..5f740f6971e1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile @@ -6,4 +6,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \ - ima_policy.o ima_audit.o + ima_policy.o +ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT) += ima_audit.o diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 3ccf7acac6df..e7c99fd0d223 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -61,10 +61,19 @@ struct ima_queue_entry { }; extern struct list_head ima_measurements; /* list of all measurements */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT /* declarations */ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *fname, const char *op, const char *cause, int result, int info); +#else +static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, + const unsigned char *fname, + const char *op, const char *cause, + int result, int info) +{ +} +#endif /* Internal IMA function definitions */ int ima_init(void); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 88a2788b981d..032ff03ad907 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -175,7 +175,9 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, } memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template)); memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE); - strncpy(entry->template.file_name, filename, IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX); + strcpy(entry->template.file_name, + (strlen(filename) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) ? + file->f_dentry->d_name.name : filename); result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode); if (!result || result == -EEXIST) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c index 21e96bf188df..7a57f6769e9c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c @@ -17,8 +17,6 @@ static int ima_audit; -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT - /* ima_audit_setup - enable informational auditing messages */ static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str) { @@ -29,7 +27,6 @@ static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str) return 1; } __setup("ima_audit=", ima_audit_setup); -#endif void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *fname, const char *op, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index e1aa2b482dd2..38477c9c3415 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -367,20 +367,11 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void) return 0; out: - securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count); - securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements); - securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements); - securityfs_remove(ima_dir); - securityfs_remove(ima_policy); - return -1; -} - -void __exit ima_fs_cleanup(void) -{ securityfs_remove(violations); securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count); securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements); securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements); securityfs_remove(ima_dir); securityfs_remove(ima_policy); + return -1; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 17f1f060306f..b5dfd534f13d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -90,8 +90,3 @@ int __init ima_init(void) return ima_fs_init(); } - -void __exit ima_cleanup(void) -{ - ima_fs_cleanup(); -} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index b17be79b9cf2..be8294915cf7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file) fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; int rc; bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false; + unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL; if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !ima_initialized) return; @@ -75,12 +76,27 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file) out: mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); + if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers) + return; + + /* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */ + pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX + 11, GFP_KERNEL); + if (pathbuf) { + pathname = d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf, PATH_MAX + 11); + if (IS_ERR(pathname)) + pathname = NULL; + else if (strlen(pathname) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) + pathname = NULL; + } if (send_tomtou) - ima_add_violation(inode, dentry->d_name.name, "invalid_pcr", - "ToMToU"); + ima_add_violation(inode, + !pathname ? dentry->d_name.name : pathname, + "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU"); if (send_writers) - ima_add_violation(inode, dentry->d_name.name, "invalid_pcr", - "open_writers"); + ima_add_violation(inode, + !pathname ? dentry->d_name.name : pathname, + "invalid_pcr", "open_writers"); + kfree(pathbuf); } static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, @@ -123,6 +139,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, { struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode; struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; + unsigned char *pathname = NULL, *pathbuf = NULL; int rc = 0; if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) @@ -147,8 +164,21 @@ retry: goto out; rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file); - if (!rc) - ima_store_measurement(iint, file, filename); + if (rc != 0) + goto out; + + if (function != BPRM_CHECK) { + /* We will allow 11 spaces for ' (deleted)' to be appended */ + pathbuf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX + 11, GFP_KERNEL); + if (pathbuf) { + pathname = + d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf, PATH_MAX + 11); + if (IS_ERR(pathname)) + pathname = NULL; + } + } + ima_store_measurement(iint, file, !pathname ? filename : pathname); + kfree(pathbuf); out: mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); return rc; @@ -228,15 +258,11 @@ static int __init init_ima(void) int error; error = ima_init(); - ima_initialized = 1; + if (!error) + ima_initialized = 1; return error; } -static void __exit cleanup_ima(void) -{ - ima_cleanup(); -} - late_initcall(init_ima); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */ MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Integrity Measurement Architecture"); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index d8edff209bf3..1a9583008aae 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = { {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, + {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_MMAP,.mask = MAY_EXEC, diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c index c92d42b021aa..1c261763f479 100644 --- a/security/keys/compat.c +++ b/security/keys/compat.c @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ * * If successful, 0 will be returned. */ -long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov( +static long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov( key_serial_t id, const struct compat_iovec __user *_payload_iov, unsigned ioc, @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov( struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack; long ret; - if (_payload_iov == 0 || ioc == 0) + if (!_payload_iov || !ioc) goto no_payload; ret = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc, diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h index c246ba5d43ab..22ff05269e3d 100644 --- a/security/keys/internal.h +++ b/security/keys/internal.h @@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t, extern long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t); extern long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t, - const struct iovec __user *, + const struct iovec *, unsigned, size_t, key_serial_t); /* diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index f1b59ae39d7e..3364fbf46807 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t id, struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack; long ret; - if (_payload_iov == 0 || ioc == 0) + if (!_payload_iov || !ioc) goto no_payload; ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc, diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index 7445875f6818..81e7852d281d 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -751,6 +751,7 @@ static void keyring_unlink_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu) int __key_link_begin(struct key *keyring, const struct key_type *type, const char *description, unsigned long *_prealloc) __acquires(&keyring->sem) + __acquires(&keyring_serialise_link_sem) { struct keyring_list *klist, *nklist; unsigned long prealloc; @@ -960,6 +961,7 @@ void __key_link(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, void __key_link_end(struct key *keyring, struct key_type *type, unsigned long prealloc) __releases(&keyring->sem) + __releases(&keyring_serialise_link_sem) { BUG_ON(type == NULL); BUG_ON(type->name == NULL); diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index cc361b8f3d13..99b36124f712 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ struct superblock_smack { char *smk_hat; char *smk_default; int smk_initialized; - spinlock_t smk_sblock; /* for initialization */ }; struct socket_smack { @@ -284,6 +283,19 @@ static inline char *smk_of_current(void) } /* + * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged + * by the onlycap rule. + */ +static inline int smack_privileged(int cap) +{ + if (!capable(cap)) + return 0; + if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == smk_of_current()) + return 1; + return 0; +} + +/* * logging functions */ #define SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED 0x1 diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c index 9f3705e92712..db14689a21e0 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c @@ -220,14 +220,9 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a) } /* - * Return if a specific label has been designated as the - * only one that gets privilege and current does not - * have that label. + * Allow for priviliged to override policy. */ - if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != sp) - goto out_audit; - - if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) + if (rc != 0 && smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) rc = 0; out_audit: diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index ee0bb5735f35..8221514cc997 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file) int rc = 0; char *sp = smk_of_current(); - if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) + if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) return 0; if (sp != smack_known_floor.smk_known) @@ -251,7 +251,6 @@ static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) sbsp->smk_floor = smack_known_floor.smk_known; sbsp->smk_hat = smack_known_hat.smk_known; sbsp->smk_initialized = 0; - spin_lock_init(&sbsp->smk_sblock); sb->s_security = sbsp; @@ -332,13 +331,10 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) char *commap; char *nsp; - spin_lock(&sp->smk_sblock); - if (sp->smk_initialized != 0) { - spin_unlock(&sp->smk_sblock); + if (sp->smk_initialized != 0) return 0; - } + sp->smk_initialized = 1; - spin_unlock(&sp->smk_sblock); for (op = data; op != NULL; op = commap) { commap = strchr(op, ','); @@ -825,7 +821,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) rc = -EPERM; /* * check label validity here so import wont fail on @@ -835,7 +831,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, smk_import(value, size) == NULL) rc = -EINVAL; } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) rc = -EPERM; if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE || strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0) @@ -931,7 +927,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 || strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP)) { - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) rc = -EPERM; } else rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); @@ -1720,7 +1716,8 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) * state into account in the decision as well as * the smack value. */ - if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) + if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || + has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) rc = 0; /* we log only if we didn't get overriden */ out_log: @@ -2721,7 +2718,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, if (p != current) return -EPERM; - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL) @@ -2784,7 +2781,7 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other); #endif - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad); /* @@ -2820,7 +2817,7 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk); #endif - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad); return rc; diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c index 1810c9a4ed48..d31e6d957c21 100644 --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c @@ -215,28 +215,27 @@ static int smk_set_access(struct smack_rule *srp, struct list_head *rule_list, * @access: access string * @rule: Smack rule * @import: if non-zero, import labels + * @len: label length limit * * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure */ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object, const char *access, struct smack_rule *rule, - int import) + int import, int len) { - int rc = -1; - int done; const char *cp; struct smack_known *skp; if (import) { - rule->smk_subject = smk_import(subject, 0); + rule->smk_subject = smk_import(subject, len); if (rule->smk_subject == NULL) return -1; - rule->smk_object = smk_import(object, 0); + rule->smk_object = smk_import(object, len); if (rule->smk_object == NULL) return -1; } else { - cp = smk_parse_smack(subject, 0); + cp = smk_parse_smack(subject, len); if (cp == NULL) return -1; skp = smk_find_entry(cp); @@ -245,7 +244,7 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object, return -1; rule->smk_subject = skp->smk_known; - cp = smk_parse_smack(object, 0); + cp = smk_parse_smack(object, len); if (cp == NULL) return -1; skp = smk_find_entry(cp); @@ -257,7 +256,7 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object, rule->smk_access = 0; - for (cp = access, done = 0; *cp && !done; cp++) { + for (cp = access; *cp != '\0'; cp++) { switch (*cp) { case '-': break; @@ -282,13 +281,11 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object, rule->smk_access |= MAY_TRANSMUTE; break; default: - done = 1; - break; + return 0; } } - rc = 0; - return rc; + return 0; } /** @@ -304,7 +301,8 @@ static int smk_parse_rule(const char *data, struct smack_rule *rule, int import) int rc; rc = smk_fill_rule(data, data + SMK_LABELLEN, - data + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN, rule, import); + data + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN, rule, import, + SMK_LABELLEN); return rc; } @@ -340,7 +338,7 @@ static int smk_parse_long_rule(const char *data, struct smack_rule *rule, goto free_out_o; if (sscanf(data, "%s %s %s", subject, object, access) == 3) - rc = smk_fill_rule(subject, object, access, rule, import); + rc = smk_fill_rule(subject, object, access, rule, import, 0); kfree(access); free_out_o: @@ -520,6 +518,9 @@ static void smk_rule_show(struct seq_file *s, struct smack_rule *srp, int max) if (strlen(srp->smk_subject) >= max || strlen(srp->smk_object) >= max) return; + if (srp->smk_access == 0) + return; + seq_printf(s, "%s %s", srp->smk_subject, srp->smk_object); seq_putc(s, ' '); @@ -534,8 +535,6 @@ static void smk_rule_show(struct seq_file *s, struct smack_rule *srp, int max) seq_putc(s, 'a'); if (srp->smk_access & MAY_TRANSMUTE) seq_putc(s, 't'); - if (srp->smk_access == 0) - seq_putc(s, '-'); seq_putc(s, '\n'); } @@ -595,13 +594,12 @@ static int smk_open_load(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - /* * Must have privilege. * No partial writes. * Enough data must be present. */ - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL, @@ -787,7 +785,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, * No partial writes. * Enough data must be present. */ - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (*ppos != 0) return -EINVAL; @@ -1090,7 +1088,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, * "<addr/mask, as a.b.c.d/e><space><label>" * "<addr, as a.b.c.d><space><label>" */ - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (*ppos != 0) return -EINVAL; @@ -1267,7 +1265,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_doi(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, char temp[80]; int i; - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0) @@ -1334,7 +1332,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_direct(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, char temp[80]; int i; - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0) @@ -1412,7 +1410,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_mapped(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, char temp[80]; int i; - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0) @@ -1503,7 +1501,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_ambient(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, char *data; int rc = count; - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -1586,7 +1584,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, char *sp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security); int rc = count; - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; /* @@ -1664,7 +1662,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_logging(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, char temp[32]; int i; - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0) @@ -1885,7 +1883,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load2(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, /* * Must have privilege. */ - if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) + if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL, @@ -2051,7 +2049,6 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) } root_inode = sb->s_root->d_inode; - root_inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(smack_known_floor.smk_known); return 0; } |