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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi
Pull EFI fixes from Ard Biesheuvel:
"Another small set of EFI fixes. Only the x86 one is likely to affect
any actual users (and has a cc:stable), but the issue it fixes was
only observed in an unusual context (kexec in a confidential VM).
- Ensure that EFI runtime services are not unmapped by PAN on ARM
- Avoid freeing the memory holding the EFI memory map inadvertently
on x86
- Avoid a false positive kmemleak warning on arm64"
* tag 'efi-fixes-for-v6.10-3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi:
efi/arm64: Fix kmemleak false positive in arm64_efi_rt_init()
efi/x86: Free EFI memory map only when installing a new one.
efi/arm: Disable LPAE PAN when calling EFI runtime services
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
- Fix the 8 bytes get_user() logic on x86-32
- Fix build bug that creates weird & mistaken target directory under
arch/x86/
* tag 'x86-urgent-2024-06-15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/boot: Don't add the EFI stub to targets, again
x86/uaccess: Fix missed zeroing of ia32 u64 get_user() range checking
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The logic in __efi_memmap_init() is shared between two different
execution flows:
- mapping the EFI memory map early or late into the kernel VA space, so
that its entries can be accessed;
- the x86 specific cloning of the EFI memory map in order to insert new
entries that are created as a result of making a memory reservation
via a call to efi_mem_reserve().
In the former case, the underlying memory containing the kernel's view
of the EFI memory map (which may be heavily modified by the kernel
itself on x86) is not modified at all, and the only thing that changes
is the virtual mapping of this memory, which is different between early
and late boot.
In the latter case, an entirely new allocation is created that carries a
new, updated version of the kernel's view of the EFI memory map. When
installing this new version, the old version will no longer be
referenced, and if the memory was allocated by the kernel, it will leak
unless it gets freed.
The logic that implements this freeing currently lives on the code path
that is shared between these two use cases, but it should only apply to
the latter. So move it to the correct spot.
While at it, drop the dummy definition for non-x86 architectures, as
that is no longer needed.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: f0ef6523475f ("efi: Fix efi_memmap_alloc() leaks")
Tested-by: Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/36ad5079-4326-45ed-85f6-928ff76483d3@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rppt/memblock
Pull memblock fixes from Mike Rapoport:
"Fix validation of NUMA coverage.
memblock_validate_numa_coverage() was checking for a unset node ID
using NUMA_NO_NODE, but x86 used MAX_NUMNODES when no node ID was
specified by buggy firmware.
Update memblock to substitute MAX_NUMNODES with NUMA_NO_NODE in
memblock_set_node() and use NUMA_NO_NODE in x86::numa_init()"
* tag 'fixes-2024-06-13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rppt/memblock:
x86/mm/numa: Use NUMA_NO_NODE when calling memblock_set_node()
memblock: make memblock_set_node() also warn about use of MAX_NUMNODES
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This is a re-commit of
da05b143a308 ("x86/boot: Don't add the EFI stub to targets")
after the tagged patch incorrectly reverted it.
vmlinux-objs-y is added to targets, with an assumption that they are all
relative to $(obj); adding a $(objtree)/drivers/... path causes the
build to incorrectly create a useless
arch/x86/boot/compressed/drivers/... directory tree.
Fix this just by using a different make variable for the EFI stub.
Fixes: cb8bda8ad443 ("x86/boot/compressed: Rename efi_thunk_64.S to efi-mixed.S")
Signed-off-by: Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.1+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/xm267ceukksz.fsf@bsegall.svl.corp.google.com
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When reworking the range checking for get_user(), the get_user_8() case
on 32-bit wasn't zeroing the high register. (The jump to bad_get_user_8
was accidentally dropped.) Restore the correct error handling
destination (and rename the jump to using the expected ".L" prefix).
While here, switch to using a named argument ("size") for the call
template ("%c4" to "%c[size]") as already used in the other call
templates in this file.
Found after moving the usercopy selftests to KUnit:
# usercopy_test_invalid: EXPECTATION FAILED at
lib/usercopy_kunit.c:278
Expected val_u64 == 0, but
val_u64 == -60129542144 (0xfffffff200000000)
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CABVgOSn=tb=Lj9SxHuT4_9MTjjKVxsq-ikdXC4kGHO4CfKVmGQ@mail.gmail.com
Fixes: b19b74bc99b1 ("x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user()")
Reported-by: David Gow <davidgow@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Qiuxu Zhuo <qiuxu.zhuo@intel.com>
Tested-by: David Gow <davidgow@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240610210213.work.143-kees%40kernel.org
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Miscellaneous fixes:
- Fix kexec() crash if call depth tracking is enabled
- Fix SMN reads on inaccessible registers on certain AMD systems"
* tag 'x86-urgent-2024-06-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/amd_nb: Check for invalid SMN reads
x86/kexec: Fix bug with call depth tracking
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memblock_set_node() warns about using MAX_NUMNODES, see
e0eec24e2e19 ("memblock: make memblock_set_node() also warn about use of MAX_NUMNODES")
for details.
Reported-by: Narasimhan V <Narasimhan.V@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[bp: commit message]
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240603141005.23261-1-bp@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/abadb736-a239-49e4-ab42-ace7acdd4278@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
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AMD Zen-based systems use a System Management Network (SMN) that
provides access to implementation-specific registers.
SMN accesses are done indirectly through an index/data pair in PCI
config space. The PCI config access may fail and return an error code.
This would prevent the "read" value from being updated.
However, the PCI config access may succeed, but the return value may be
invalid. This is in similar fashion to PCI bad reads, i.e. return all
bits set.
Most systems will return 0 for SMN addresses that are not accessible.
This is in line with AMD convention that unavailable registers are
Read-as-Zero/Writes-Ignored.
However, some systems will return a "PCI Error Response" instead. This
value, along with an error code of 0 from the PCI config access, will
confuse callers of the amd_smn_read() function.
Check for this condition, clear the return value, and set a proper error
code.
Fixes: ddfe43cdc0da ("x86/amd_nb: Add SMN and Indirect Data Fabric access for AMD Fam17h")
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230403164244.471141-1-yazen.ghannam@amd.com
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Drop the second snapshot of mmu_invalidate_seq in kvm_faultin_pfn().
Before checking the mismatch of private vs. shared, mmu_invalidate_seq is
saved to fault->mmu_seq, which can be used to detect an invalidation
related to the gfn occurred, i.e. KVM will not install a mapping in page
table if fault->mmu_seq != mmu_invalidate_seq.
Currently there is a second snapshot of mmu_invalidate_seq, which may not
be same as the first snapshot in kvm_faultin_pfn(), i.e. the gfn attribute
may be changed between the two snapshots, but the gfn may be mapped in
page table without hindrance. Therefore, drop the second snapshot as it
has no obvious benefits.
Fixes: f6adeae81f35 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Handle no-slot faults at the beginning of kvm_faultin_pfn()")
Signed-off-by: Tao Su <tao1.su@linux.intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240528102234.2162763-1-tao1.su@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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* Fixes and debugging help for the #VE sanity check. Also disable
it by default, even for CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL, because it was found
to trigger spuriously (most likely a processor erratum as the
exact symptoms vary by generation).
* Avoid WARN() when two NMIs arrive simultaneously during an NMI-disabled
situation (GIF=0 or interrupt shadow) when the processor supports
virtual NMI. While generally KVM will not request an NMI window
when virtual NMIs are supported, in this case it *does* have to
single-step over the interrupt shadow or enable the STGI intercept,
in order to deliver the latched second NMI.
* Drop support for hand tuning APIC timer advancement from userspace.
Since we have adaptive tuning, and it has proved to work well,
drop the module parameter for manual configuration and with it a
few stupid bugs that it had.
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Remove support for specifying a static local APIC timer advancement value,
and instead present a read-only boolean parameter to let userspace enable
or disable KVM's dynamic APIC timer advancement. Realistically, it's all
but impossible for userspace to specify an advancement that is more
precise than what KVM's adaptive tuning can provide. E.g. a static value
needs to be tuned for the exact hardware and kernel, and if KVM is using
hrtimers, likely requires additional tuning for the exact configuration of
the entire system.
Dropping support for a userspace provided value also fixes several flaws
in the interface. E.g. KVM interprets a negative value other than -1 as a
large advancement, toggling between a negative and positive value yields
unpredictable behavior as vCPUs will switch from dynamic to static
advancement, changing the advancement in the middle of VM creation can
result in different values for vCPUs within a VM, etc. Those flaws are
mostly fixable, but there's almost no justification for taking on yet more
complexity (it's minimal complexity, but still non-zero).
The only arguments against using KVM's adaptive tuning is if a setup needs
a higher maximum, or if the adjustments are too reactive, but those are
arguments for letting userspace control the absolute max advancement and
the granularity of each adjustment, e.g. similar to how KVM provides knobs
for halt polling.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240520115334.852510-1-zhoushuling@huawei.com
Cc: Shuling Zhou <zhoushuling@huawei.com>
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240522010304.1650603-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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As documented in APM[1], LBR Virtualization must be enabled for SEV-ES
guests. Although KVM currently enforces LBRV for SEV-ES guests, there
are multiple issues with it:
o MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR is still intercepted. Since MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR
interception is used to dynamically toggle LBRV for performance reasons,
this can be fatal for SEV-ES guests. For ex SEV-ES guest on Zen3:
[guest ~]# wrmsr 0x1d9 0x4
KVM: entry failed, hardware error 0xffffffff
EAX=00000004 EBX=00000000 ECX=000001d9 EDX=00000000
Fix this by never intercepting MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR for SEV-ES guests.
No additional save/restore logic is required since MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR
is of swap type A.
o KVM will disable LBRV if userspace sets MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR before the
VMSA is encrypted. Fix this by moving LBRV enablement code post VMSA
encryption.
[1]: AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Pub. 40332, Rev. 4.07 - June
2023, Vol 2, 15.35.2 Enabling SEV-ES.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=304653
Fixes: 376c6d285017 ("KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU creation/loading")
Co-developed-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240531044644.768-4-ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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As documented in APM[1], LBR Virtualization must be enabled for SEV-ES
guests. So, prevent SEV-ES guests when LBRV support is missing.
[1]: AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Pub. 40332, Rev. 4.07 - June
2023, Vol 2, 15.35.2 Enabling SEV-ES.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=304653
Fixes: 376c6d285017 ("KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU creation/loading")
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240531044644.768-3-ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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KVM currently allows userspace to read/write MSRs even after the VMSA is
encrypted. This can cause unintentional issues if MSR access has side-
effects. For ex, while migrating a guest, userspace could attempt to
migrate MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR and end up unintentionally disabling LBRV on
the target. Fix this by preventing access to those MSRs which are context
switched via the VMSA, once the VMSA is encrypted.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240531044644.768-2-ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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The call to cc_platform_has() triggers a fault and system crash if call depth
tracking is active because the GS segment has been reset by load_segments() and
GS_BASE is now 0 but call depth tracking uses per-CPU variables to operate.
Call cc_platform_has() earlier in the function when GS is still valid.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Fixes: 5d8213864ade ("x86/retbleed: Add SKL return thunk")
Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240603083036.637-1-bp@kernel.org
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Miscellaneous topology parsing fixes:
- Fix topology parsing regression on older CPUs in the new AMD/Hygon
parser
- Fix boot crash on odd Intel Quark and similar CPUs that do not fill
out cpuinfo_x86::x86_clflush_size and zero out
cpuinfo_x86::x86_cache_alignment as a result.
Provide 32 bytes as a general fallback value.
- Fix topology enumeration on certain rare CPUs where the BIOS locks
certain CPUID leaves and the kernel unlocked them late, which broke
with the new topology parsing code. Factor out this unlocking logic
and move it earlier in the parsing sequence"
* tag 'x86-urgent-2024-06-02' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/topology/intel: Unlock CPUID before evaluating anything
x86/cpu: Provide default cache line size if not enumerated
x86/topology/amd: Evaluate SMT in CPUID leaf 0x8000001e only on family 0x17 and greater
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull scheduler fix from Ingo Molnar:
"Export a symbol to make life easier for instrumentation/debugging"
* tag 'sched-urgent-2024-06-02' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
sched/x86: Export 'percpu arch_freq_scale'
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Intel CPUs have a MSR bit to limit CPUID enumeration to leaf two. If
this bit is set by the BIOS then CPUID evaluation including topology
enumeration does not work correctly as the evaluation code does not try
to analyze any leaf greater than two.
This went unnoticed before because the original topology code just
repeated evaluation several times and managed to overwrite the initial
limited information with the correct one later. The new evaluation code
does it once and therefore ends up with the limited and wrong
information.
Cure this by unlocking CPUID right before evaluating anything which
depends on the maximum CPUID leaf being greater than two instead of
rereading stuff after unlock.
Fixes: 22d63660c35e ("x86/cpu: Use common topology code for Intel")
Reported-by: Peter Schneider <pschneider1968@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Peter Schneider <pschneider1968@googlemail.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/fd3f73dc-a86f-4bcf-9c60-43556a21eb42@googlemail.com
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Commit:
7bc263840bc3 ("sched/topology: Consolidate and clean up access to a CPU's max compute capacity")
removed rq->cpu_capacity_orig in favor of using arch_scale_freq_capacity()
calls. Export the underlying percpu symbol on x86 so that external trace
point helper modules can be made to work again.
Signed-off-by: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240530181548.2039216-1-pauld@redhat.com
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Fix the 'make W=1 C=1' warnings:
WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() in arch/x86/events/intel/intel-uncore.o
WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() in arch/x86/events/intel/intel-cstate.o
Signed-off-by: Jeff Johnson <quic_jjohnson@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240530-md-arch-x86-events-intel-v1-1-8252194ed20a@quicinc.com
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Fix the warning from 'make C=1 W=1':
WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() in arch/x86/events/rapl.o
Signed-off-by: Jeff Johnson <quic_jjohnson@quicinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240530-md-arch-x86-events-v1-1-e45ffa8af99f@quicinc.com
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tl;dr: CPUs with CPUID.80000008H but without CPUID.01H:EDX[CLFSH]
will end up reporting cache_line_size()==0 and bad things happen.
Fill in a default on those to avoid the problem.
Long Story:
The kernel dies a horrible death if c->x86_cache_alignment (aka.
cache_line_size() is 0. Normally, this value is populated from
c->x86_clflush_size.
Right now the code is set up to get c->x86_clflush_size from two
places. First, modern CPUs get it from CPUID. Old CPUs that don't
have leaf 0x80000008 (or CPUID at all) just get some sane defaults
from the kernel in get_cpu_address_sizes().
The vast majority of CPUs that have leaf 0x80000008 also get
->x86_clflush_size from CPUID. But there are oddballs.
Intel Quark CPUs[1] and others[2] have leaf 0x80000008 but don't set
CPUID.01H:EDX[CLFSH], so they skip over filling in ->x86_clflush_size:
cpuid(0x00000001, &tfms, &misc, &junk, &cap0);
if (cap0 & (1<<19))
c->x86_clflush_size = ((misc >> 8) & 0xff) * 8;
So they: land in get_cpu_address_sizes() and see that CPUID has level
0x80000008 and jump into the side of the if() that does not fill in
c->x86_clflush_size. That assigns a 0 to c->x86_cache_alignment, and
hilarity ensues in code like:
buffer = kzalloc(ALIGN(sizeof(*buffer), cache_line_size()),
GFP_KERNEL);
To fix this, always provide a sane value for ->x86_clflush_size.
Big thanks to Andy Shevchenko for finding and reporting this and also
providing a first pass at a fix. But his fix was only partial and only
worked on the Quark CPUs. It would not, for instance, have worked on
the QEMU config.
1. https://raw.githubusercontent.com/InstLatx64/InstLatx64/master/GenuineIntel/GenuineIntel0000590_Clanton_03_CPUID.txt
2. You can also get this behavior if you use "-cpu 486,+clzero"
in QEMU.
[ dhansen: remove 'vp_bits_from_cpuid' reference in changelog
because bpetkov brutally murdered it recently. ]
Fixes: fbf6449f84bf ("x86/sev-es: Set x86_virt_bits to the correct value straight away, instead of a two-phase approach")
Reported-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jörn Heusipp <osmanx@heusipp.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240516173928.3960193-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/5e31cad3-ad4d-493e-ab07-724cfbfaba44@heusipp.de/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240517200534.8EC5F33E%40davehans-spike.ostc.intel.com
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and greater
The new AMD/HYGON topology parser evaluates the SMT information in CPUID leaf
0x8000001e unconditionally while the original code restricted it to CPUs with
family 0x17 and greater.
This breaks family 0x15 CPUs which advertise that leaf and have a non-zero
value in the SMT section. The machine boots, but the scheduler complains loudly
about the mismatch of the core IDs:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at kernel/sched/core.c:6482 sched_cpu_starting+0x183/0x250
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at kernel/sched/topology.c:2408 build_sched_domains+0x76b/0x12b0
Add the condition back to cure it.
[ bp: Make it actually build because grandpa is not concerned with
trivial stuff. :-P ]
Fixes: f7fb3b2dd92c ("x86/cpu: Provide an AMD/HYGON specific topology parser")
Closes: https://gitlab.archlinux.org/archlinux/packaging/packages/linux/-/issues/56
Reported-by: Tim Teichmann <teichmanntim@outlook.de>
Reported-by: Christian Heusel <christian@heusel.eu>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Tim Teichmann <teichmanntim@outlook.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7skhx6mwe4hxiul64v6azhlxnokheorksqsdbp7qw6g2jduf6c@7b5pvomauugk
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull irq fixes from Ingo Molnar:
- Fix x86 IRQ vector leak caused by a CPU offlining race
- Fix build failure in the riscv-imsic irqchip driver
caused by an API-change semantic conflict
- Fix use-after-free in irq_find_at_or_after()
* tag 'irq-urgent-2024-05-25' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
genirq/irqdesc: Prevent use-after-free in irq_find_at_or_after()
genirq/cpuhotplug, x86/vector: Prevent vector leak during CPU offline
irqchip/riscv-imsic: Fixup riscv_ipi_set_virq_range() conflict
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar:
- Fix regressions of the new x86 CPU VFM (vendor/family/model)
enumeration/matching code
- Fix crash kernel detection on buggy firmware with
non-compliant ACPI MADT tables
- Address Kconfig warning
* tag 'x86-urgent-2024-05-25' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/cpu: Fix x86_match_cpu() to match just X86_VENDOR_INTEL
crypto: x86/aes-xts - switch to new Intel CPU model defines
x86/topology: Handle bogus ACPI tables correctly
x86/kconfig: Select ARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS again when UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER=y
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/uml/linux
Pull UML updates from Richard Weinberger:
- Fixes for -Wmissing-prototypes warnings and further cleanup
- Remove callback returning void from rtc and virtio drivers
- Fix bash location
* tag 'uml-for-linus-6.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/uml/linux: (26 commits)
um: virtio_uml: Convert to platform remove callback returning void
um: rtc: Convert to platform remove callback returning void
um: Remove unused do_get_thread_area function
um: Fix -Wmissing-prototypes warnings for __vdso_*
um: Add an internal header shared among the user code
um: Fix the declaration of kasan_map_memory
um: Fix the -Wmissing-prototypes warning for get_thread_reg
um: Fix the -Wmissing-prototypes warning for __switch_mm
um: Fix -Wmissing-prototypes warnings for (rt_)sigreturn
um: Stop tracking host PID in cpu_tasks
um: process: remove unused 'n' variable
um: vector: remove unused len variable/calculation
um: vector: fix bpfflash parameter evaluation
um: slirp: remove set but unused variable 'pid'
um: signal: move pid variable where needed
um: Makefile: use bash from the environment
um: Add winch to winch_handlers before registering winch IRQ
um: Fix -Wmissing-prototypes warnings for __warp_* and foo
um: Fix -Wmissing-prototypes warnings for text_poke*
um: Move declarations to proper headers
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull more mm updates from Andrew Morton:
"Jeff Xu's implementation of the mseal() syscall"
* tag 'mm-stable-2024-05-24-11-49' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm:
selftest mm/mseal read-only elf memory segment
mseal: add documentation
selftest mm/mseal memory sealing
mseal: add mseal syscall
mseal: wire up mseal syscall
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip
Pull xen updates from Juergen Gross:
- a small cleanup in the drivers/xen/xenbus Makefile
- a fix of the Xen xenstore driver to improve connecting to a late
started Xenstore
- an enhancement for better support of ballooning in PVH guests
- a cleanup using try_cmpxchg() instead of open coding it
* tag 'for-linus-6.10a-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/xen/tip:
drivers/xen: Improve the late XenStore init protocol
xen/xenbus: Use *-y instead of *-objs in Makefile
xen/x86: add extra pages to unpopulated-alloc if available
locking/x86/xen: Use try_cmpxchg() in xen_alloc_p2m_entry()
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Patch series "Introduce mseal", v10.
This patchset proposes a new mseal() syscall for the Linux kernel.
In a nutshell, mseal() protects the VMAs of a given virtual memory range
against modifications, such as changes to their permission bits.
Modern CPUs support memory permissions, such as the read/write (RW) and
no-execute (NX) bits. Linux has supported NX since the release of kernel
version 2.6.8 in August 2004 [1]. The memory permission feature improves
the security stance on memory corruption bugs, as an attacker cannot
simply write to arbitrary memory and point the code to it. The memory
must be marked with the X bit, or else an exception will occur.
Internally, the kernel maintains the memory permissions in a data
structure called VMA (vm_area_struct). mseal() additionally protects the
VMA itself against modifications of the selected seal type.
Memory sealing is useful to mitigate memory corruption issues where a
corrupted pointer is passed to a memory management system. For example,
such an attacker primitive can break control-flow integrity guarantees
since read-only memory that is supposed to be trusted can become writable
or .text pages can get remapped. Memory sealing can automatically be
applied by the runtime loader to seal .text and .rodata pages and
applications can additionally seal security critical data at runtime. A
similar feature already exists in the XNU kernel with the
VM_FLAGS_PERMANENT [3] flag and on OpenBSD with the mimmutable syscall
[4]. Also, Chrome wants to adopt this feature for their CFI work [2] and
this patchset has been designed to be compatible with the Chrome use case.
Two system calls are involved in sealing the map: mmap() and mseal().
The new mseal() is an syscall on 64 bit CPU, and with following signature:
int mseal(void addr, size_t len, unsigned long flags)
addr/len: memory range.
flags: reserved.
mseal() blocks following operations for the given memory range.
1> Unmapping, moving to another location, and shrinking the size,
via munmap() and mremap(), can leave an empty space, therefore can
be replaced with a VMA with a new set of attributes.
2> Moving or expanding a different VMA into the current location,
via mremap().
3> Modifying a VMA via mmap(MAP_FIXED).
4> Size expansion, via mremap(), does not appear to pose any specific
risks to sealed VMAs. It is included anyway because the use case is
unclear. In any case, users can rely on merging to expand a sealed VMA.
5> mprotect() and pkey_mprotect().
6> Some destructive madvice() behaviors (e.g. MADV_DONTNEED) for anonymous
memory, when users don't have write permission to the memory. Those
behaviors can alter region contents by discarding pages, effectively a
memset(0) for anonymous memory.
The idea that inspired this patch comes from Stephen Röttger’s work in
V8 CFI [5]. Chrome browser in ChromeOS will be the first user of this
API.
Indeed, the Chrome browser has very specific requirements for sealing,
which are distinct from those of most applications. For example, in the
case of libc, sealing is only applied to read-only (RO) or read-execute
(RX) memory segments (such as .text and .RELRO) to prevent them from
becoming writable, the lifetime of those mappings are tied to the lifetime
of the process.
Chrome wants to seal two large address space reservations that are managed
by different allocators. The memory is mapped RW- and RWX respectively
but write access to it is restricted using pkeys (or in the future ARM
permission overlay extensions). The lifetime of those mappings are not
tied to the lifetime of the process, therefore, while the memory is
sealed, the allocators still need to free or discard the unused memory.
For example, with madvise(DONTNEED).
However, always allowing madvise(DONTNEED) on this range poses a security
risk. For example if a jump instruction crosses a page boundary and the
second page gets discarded, it will overwrite the target bytes with zeros
and change the control flow. Checking write-permission before the discard
operation allows us to control when the operation is valid. In this case,
the madvise will only succeed if the executing thread has PKEY write
permissions and PKRU changes are protected in software by control-flow
integrity.
Although the initial version of this patch series is targeting the Chrome
browser as its first user, it became evident during upstream discussions
that we would also want to ensure that the patch set eventually is a
complete solution for memory sealing and compatible with other use cases.
The specific scenario currently in mind is glibc's use case of loading and
sealing ELF executables. To this end, Stephen is working on a change to
glibc to add sealing support to the dynamic linker, which will seal all
non-writable segments at startup. Once this work is completed, all
applications will be able to automatically benefit from these new
protections.
In closing, I would like to formally acknowledge the valuable
contributions received during the RFC process, which were instrumental in
shaping this patch:
Jann Horn: raising awareness and providing valuable insights on the
destructive madvise operations.
Liam R. Howlett: perf optimization.
Linus Torvalds: assisting in defining system call signature and scope.
Theo de Raadt: sharing the experiences and insight gained from
implementing mimmutable() in OpenBSD.
MM perf benchmarks
==================
This patch adds a loop in the mprotect/munmap/madvise(DONTNEED) to
check the VMAs’ sealing flag, so that no partial update can be made,
when any segment within the given memory range is sealed.
To measure the performance impact of this loop, two tests are developed.
[8]
The first is measuring the time taken for a particular system call,
by using clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC). The second is using
PERF_COUNT_HW_REF_CPU_CYCLES (exclude user space). Both tests have
similar results.
The tests have roughly below sequence:
for (i = 0; i < 1000, i++)
create 1000 mappings (1 page per VMA)
start the sampling
for (j = 0; j < 1000, j++)
mprotect one mapping
stop and save the sample
delete 1000 mappings
calculates all samples.
Below tests are performed on Intel(R) Pentium(R) Gold 7505 @ 2.00GHz,
4G memory, Chromebook.
Based on the latest upstream code:
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t t_mseal delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 909 944 35 35 104%
munmap__ 2 1398 1502 104 52 107%
munmap__ 4 2444 2594 149 37 106%
munmap__ 8 4029 4323 293 37 107%
munmap__ 16 6647 6935 288 18 104%
munmap__ 32 11811 12398 587 18 105%
mprotect 1 439 465 26 26 106%
mprotect 2 1659 1745 86 43 105%
mprotect 4 3747 3889 142 36 104%
mprotect 8 6755 6969 215 27 103%
mprotect 16 13748 14144 396 25 103%
mprotect 32 27827 28969 1142 36 104%
madvise_ 1 240 262 22 22 109%
madvise_ 2 366 442 76 38 121%
madvise_ 4 623 751 128 32 121%
madvise_ 8 1110 1324 215 27 119%
madvise_ 16 2127 2451 324 20 115%
madvise_ 32 4109 4642 534 17 113%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ vmas cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 1790 1890 100 100 106%
munmap__ 2 2819 3033 214 107 108%
munmap__ 4 4959 5271 312 78 106%
munmap__ 8 8262 8745 483 60 106%
munmap__ 16 13099 14116 1017 64 108%
munmap__ 32 23221 24785 1565 49 107%
mprotect 1 906 967 62 62 107%
mprotect 2 3019 3203 184 92 106%
mprotect 4 6149 6569 420 105 107%
mprotect 8 9978 10524 545 68 105%
mprotect 16 20448 21427 979 61 105%
mprotect 32 40972 42935 1963 61 105%
madvise_ 1 434 497 63 63 115%
madvise_ 2 752 899 147 74 120%
madvise_ 4 1313 1513 200 50 115%
madvise_ 8 2271 2627 356 44 116%
madvise_ 16 4312 4883 571 36 113%
madvise_ 32 8376 9319 943 29 111%
Based on the result, for 6.8 kernel, sealing check adds
20-40 nano seconds, or around 50-100 CPU cycles, per VMA.
In addition, I applied the sealing to 5.10 kernel:
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t tmseal delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 357 390 33 33 109%
munmap__ 2 442 463 21 11 105%
munmap__ 4 614 634 20 5 103%
munmap__ 8 1017 1137 120 15 112%
munmap__ 16 1889 2153 263 16 114%
munmap__ 32 4109 4088 -21 -1 99%
mprotect 1 235 227 -7 -7 97%
mprotect 2 495 464 -30 -15 94%
mprotect 4 741 764 24 6 103%
mprotect 8 1434 1437 2 0 100%
mprotect 16 2958 2991 33 2 101%
mprotect 32 6431 6608 177 6 103%
madvise_ 1 191 208 16 16 109%
madvise_ 2 300 324 24 12 108%
madvise_ 4 450 473 23 6 105%
madvise_ 8 753 806 53 7 107%
madvise_ 16 1467 1592 125 8 108%
madvise_ 32 2795 3405 610 19 122%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ nbr_vma cpu cmseal delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 684 715 31 31 105%
munmap__ 2 861 898 38 19 104%
munmap__ 4 1183 1235 51 13 104%
munmap__ 8 1999 2045 46 6 102%
munmap__ 16 3839 3816 -23 -1 99%
munmap__ 32 7672 7887 216 7 103%
mprotect 1 397 443 46 46 112%
mprotect 2 738 788 50 25 107%
mprotect 4 1221 1256 35 9 103%
mprotect 8 2356 2429 72 9 103%
mprotect 16 4961 4935 -26 -2 99%
mprotect 32 9882 10172 291 9 103%
madvise_ 1 351 380 29 29 108%
madvise_ 2 565 615 49 25 109%
madvise_ 4 872 933 61 15 107%
madvise_ 8 1508 1640 132 16 109%
madvise_ 16 3078 3323 245 15 108%
madvise_ 32 5893 6704 811 25 114%
For 5.10 kernel, sealing check adds 0-15 ns in time, or 10-30
CPU cycles, there is even decrease in some cases.
It might be interesting to compare 5.10 and 6.8 kernel
The first test (measuring time)
syscall__ vmas t_5_10 t_6_8 delta_ns per_vma %
munmap__ 1 357 909 552 552 254%
munmap__ 2 442 1398 956 478 316%
munmap__ 4 614 2444 1830 458 398%
munmap__ 8 1017 4029 3012 377 396%
munmap__ 16 1889 6647 4758 297 352%
munmap__ 32 4109 11811 7702 241 287%
mprotect 1 235 439 204 204 187%
mprotect 2 495 1659 1164 582 335%
mprotect 4 741 3747 3006 752 506%
mprotect 8 1434 6755 5320 665 471%
mprotect 16 2958 13748 10790 674 465%
mprotect 32 6431 27827 21397 669 433%
madvise_ 1 191 240 49 49 125%
madvise_ 2 300 366 67 33 122%
madvise_ 4 450 623 173 43 138%
madvise_ 8 753 1110 357 45 147%
madvise_ 16 1467 2127 660 41 145%
madvise_ 32 2795 4109 1314 41 147%
The second test (measuring cpu cycle)
syscall__ vmas cpu_5_10 c_6_8 delta_cpu per_vma %
munmap__ 1 684 1790 1106 1106 262%
munmap__ 2 861 2819 1958 979 327%
munmap__ 4 1183 4959 3776 944 419%
munmap__ 8 1999 8262 6263 783 413%
munmap__ 16 3839 13099 9260 579 341%
munmap__ 32 7672 23221 15549 486 303%
mprotect 1 397 906 509 509 228%
mprotect 2 738 3019 2281 1140 409%
mprotect 4 1221 6149 4929 1232 504%
mprotect 8 2356 9978 7622 953 423%
mprotect 16 4961 20448 15487 968 412%
mprotect 32 9882 40972 31091 972 415%
madvise_ 1 351 434 82 82 123%
madvise_ 2 565 752 186 93 133%
madvise_ 4 872 1313 442 110 151%
madvise_ 8 1508 2271 763 95 151%
madvise_ 16 3078 4312 1234 77 140%
madvise_ 32 5893 8376 2483 78 142%
From 5.10 to 6.8
munmap: added 250-550 ns in time, or 500-1100 in cpu cycle, per vma.
mprotect: added 200-750 ns in time, or 500-1200 in cpu cycle, per vma.
madvise: added 33-50 ns in time, or 70-110 in cpu cycle, per vma.
In comparison to mseal, which adds 20-40 ns or 50-100 CPU cycles, the
increase from 5.10 to 6.8 is significantly larger, approximately ten times
greater for munmap and mprotect.
When I discuss the mm performance with Brian Makin, an engineer who worked
on performance, it was brought to my attention that such performance
benchmarks, which measuring millions of mm syscall in a tight loop, may
not accurately reflect real-world scenarios, such as that of a database
service. Also this is tested using a single HW and ChromeOS, the data
from another HW or distribution might be different. It might be best to
take this data with a grain of salt.
This patch (of 5):
Wire up mseal syscall for all architectures.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-1-jeffxu@chromium.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240415163527.626541-2-jeffxu@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> [Bug #2]
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Muhammad Usama Anjum <usama.anjum@collabora.com>
Cc: Pedro Falcato <pedro.falcato@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Röttger <sroettger@google.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Amer Al Shanawany <amer.shanawany@gmail.com>
Cc: Javier Carrasco <javier.carrasco.cruz@gmail.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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The absence of IRQD_MOVE_PCNTXT prevents immediate effectiveness of
interrupt affinity reconfiguration via procfs. Instead, the change is
deferred until the next instance of the interrupt being triggered on the
original CPU.
When the interrupt next triggers on the original CPU, the new affinity is
enforced within __irq_move_irq(). A vector is allocated from the new CPU,
but the old vector on the original CPU remains and is not immediately
reclaimed. Instead, apicd->move_in_progress is flagged, and the reclaiming
process is delayed until the next trigger of the interrupt on the new CPU.
Upon the subsequent triggering of the interrupt on the new CPU,
irq_complete_move() adds a task to the old CPU's vector_cleanup list if it
remains online. Subsequently, the timer on the old CPU iterates over its
vector_cleanup list, reclaiming old vectors.
However, a rare scenario arises if the old CPU is outgoing before the
interrupt triggers again on the new CPU.
In that case irq_force_complete_move() is not invoked on the outgoing CPU
to reclaim the old apicd->prev_vector because the interrupt isn't currently
affine to the outgoing CPU, and irq_needs_fixup() returns false. Even
though __vector_schedule_cleanup() is later called on the new CPU, it
doesn't reclaim apicd->prev_vector; instead, it simply resets both
apicd->move_in_progress and apicd->prev_vector to 0.
As a result, the vector remains unreclaimed in vector_matrix, leading to a
CPU vector leak.
To address this issue, move the invocation of irq_force_complete_move()
before the irq_needs_fixup() call to reclaim apicd->prev_vector, if the
interrupt is currently or used to be affine to the outgoing CPU.
Additionally, reclaim the vector in __vector_schedule_cleanup() as well,
following a warning message, although theoretically it should never see
apicd->move_in_progress with apicd->prev_cpu pointing to an offline CPU.
Fixes: f0383c24b485 ("genirq/cpuhotplug: Add support for cleaning up move in progress")
Signed-off-by: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240522220218.162423-1-dongli.zhang@oracle.com
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace
Pull tracing cleanup from Steven Rostedt:
"Remove second argument of __assign_str()
The __assign_str() macro logic of the TRACE_EVENT() macro was
optimized so that it no longer needs the second argument. The
__assign_str() is always matched with __string() field that takes a
field name and the source for that field:
__string(field, source)
The TRACE_EVENT() macro logic will save off the source value and then
use that value to copy into the ring buffer via the __assign_str().
Before commit c1fa617caeb0 ("tracing: Rework __assign_str() and
__string() to not duplicate getting the string"), the __assign_str()
needed the second argument which would perform the same logic as the
__string() source parameter did. Not only would this add overhead, but
it was error prone as if the __assign_str() source produced something
different, it may not have allocated enough for the string in the ring
buffer (as the __string() source was used to determine how much to
allocate)
Now that the __assign_str() just uses the same string that was used in
__string() it no longer needs the source parameter. It can now be
removed"
* tag 'trace-assign-str-v6.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace:
tracing/treewide: Remove second parameter of __assign_str()
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When requesting an NMI window, WARN on vNMI support being enabled if and
only if NMIs are actually masked, i.e. if the vCPU is already handling an
NMI. KVM's ABI for NMIs that arrive simultanesouly (from KVM's point of
view) is to inject one NMI and pend the other. When using vNMI, KVM pends
the second NMI simply by setting V_NMI_PENDING, and lets the CPU do the
rest (hardware automatically sets V_NMI_BLOCKING when an NMI is injected).
However, if KVM can't immediately inject an NMI, e.g. because the vCPU is
in an STI shadow or is running with GIF=0, then KVM will request an NMI
window and trigger the WARN (but still function correctly).
Whether or not the GIF=0 case makes sense is debatable, as the intent of
KVM's behavior is to provide functionality that is as close to real
hardware as possible. E.g. if two NMIs are sent in quick succession, the
probability of both NMIs arriving in an STI shadow is infinitesimally low
on real hardware, but significantly larger in a virtual environment, e.g.
if the vCPU is preempted in the STI shadow. For GIF=0, the argument isn't
as clear cut, because the window where two NMIs can collide is much larger
in bare metal (though still small).
That said, KVM should not have divergent behavior for the GIF=0 case based
on whether or not vNMI support is enabled. And KVM has allowed
simultaneous NMIs with GIF=0 for over a decade, since commit 7460fb4a3400
("KVM: Fix simultaneous NMIs"). I.e. KVM's GIF=0 handling shouldn't be
modified without a *really* good reason to do so, and if KVM's behavior
were to be modified, it should be done irrespective of vNMI support.
Fixes: fa4c027a7956 ("KVM: x86: Add support for SVM's Virtual NMI")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Santosh Shukla <Santosh.Shukla@amd.com>
Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240522021435.1684366-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Force KVM_WERROR if the global WERROR is enabled to avoid pestering the
user about a Kconfig that will ultimately be ignored. Force KVM_WERROR
instead of making it mutually exclusive with WERROR to avoid generating a
.config builds KVM with -Werror, but has KVM_WERROR=n.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240517180341.974251-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Disable KVM's "prove #VE" support by default, as it provides no functional
value, and even its sanity checking benefits are relatively limited. I.e.
it should be fully opt-in even on debug kernels, especially since EPT
Violation #VE suppression appears to be buggy on some CPUs.
Opportunistically add a line in the help text to make it abundantly clear
that KVM_INTEL_PROVE_VE should never be enabled in a production
environment.
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240518000430.1118488-10-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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Don't suppress printing EPT_VIOLATION_VE in /proc/cpuinfo, knowing whether
or not KVM_INTEL_PROVE_VE actually does anything is extremely valuable.
A privileged user can get at the information by reading the raw MSR, but
the whole point of the VMX flags is to avoid needing to glean information
from raw MSR reads.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240518000430.1118488-9-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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Print the SPTEs that correspond to the faulting GPA on an unexpected EPT
Violation #VE to help the user debug failures, e.g. to pinpoint which SPTE
didn't have SUPPRESS_VE set.
Opportunistically assert that the underlying exit reason was indeed an EPT
Violation, as the CPU has *really* gone off the rails if a #VE occurs due
to a completely unexpected exit reason.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240518000430.1118488-7-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
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Dump the VMCS on an unexpected #VE, otherwise it's practically impossible
to figure out why the #VE occurred.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240518000430.1118488-6-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Assert that KVM doesn't set a SPTE to a value that could trigger an EPT
Violation #VE on a non-MMIO SPTE, e.g. to help detect bugs even without
KVM_INTEL_PROVE_VE enabled, and to help debug actual #VE failures.
Note, this will run afoul of TDX support, which needs to reflect emulated
MMIO accesses into the guest as #VEs (which was the whole point of adding
EPT Violation #VE support in KVM). The obvious fix for that is to exempt
MMIO SPTEs, but that's annoyingly difficult now that is_mmio_spte() relies
on a per-VM value. However, resolving that conundrum is a future problem,
whereas getting KVM_INTEL_PROVE_VE healthy is a current problem.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240518000430.1118488-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
|
|
Always handle #VEs, e.g. due to prove EPT Violation #VE failures, in L0,
as KVM does not expose any #VE capabilities to L1, i.e. any and all #VEs
are KVM's responsibility.
Fixes: 8131cf5b4fd8 ("KVM: VMX: Introduce test mode related to EPT violation VE")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240518000430.1118488-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Point vmcs02.VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS at the vCPU's #VE info page when
initializing vmcs02, otherwise KVM will run L2 with EPT Violation #VE
enabled and a VE info address pointing at pfn 0.
Fixes: 8131cf5b4fd8 ("KVM: VMX: Introduce test mode related to EPT violation VE")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240518000430.1118488-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Don't terminate the VM on an unexpected #VE, as it's extremely unlikely
the #VE is fatal to the guest, and even less likely that it presents a
danger to the host. Simply resume the guest on "failure", as the #VE info
page's BUSY field will prevent converting any more EPT Violations to #VEs
for the vCPU (at least, that's what the BUSY field is supposed to do).
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240518000430.1118488-8-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Use SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE when zapping TDP MMU SPTEs with mmu_lock held
for read, tdp_mmu_zap_spte_atomic() was simply missed during the initial
development.
Fixes: 7f01cab84928 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero value for non-present SPTE and removed SPTE")
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
[sean: write changelog]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240518000430.1118488-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull more non-mm updates from Andrew Morton:
- A series ("kbuild: enable more warnings by default") from Arnd
Bergmann which enables a number of additional build-time warnings. We
fixed all the fallout which we could find, there may still be a few
stragglers.
- Samuel Holland has developed the series "Unified cross-architecture
kernel-mode FPU API". This does a lot of consolidation of
per-architecture kernel-mode FPU usage and enables the use of newer
AMD GPUs on RISC-V.
- Tao Su has fixed some selftests build warnings in the series
"Selftests: Fix compilation warnings due to missing _GNU_SOURCE
definition".
- This pull also includes a nilfs2 fixup from Ryusuke Konishi.
* tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2024-05-22-17-30' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (23 commits)
nilfs2: make block erasure safe in nilfs_finish_roll_forward()
selftests/harness: use 1024 in place of LINE_MAX
Revert "selftests/harness: remove use of LINE_MAX"
selftests/fpu: allow building on other architectures
selftests/fpu: move FP code to a separate translation unit
drm/amd/display: use ARCH_HAS_KERNEL_FPU_SUPPORT
drm/amd/display: only use hard-float, not altivec on powerpc
riscv: add support for kernel-mode FPU
x86: implement ARCH_HAS_KERNEL_FPU_SUPPORT
powerpc: implement ARCH_HAS_KERNEL_FPU_SUPPORT
LoongArch: implement ARCH_HAS_KERNEL_FPU_SUPPORT
lib/raid6: use CC_FLAGS_FPU for NEON CFLAGS
arm64: crypto: use CC_FLAGS_FPU for NEON CFLAGS
arm64: implement ARCH_HAS_KERNEL_FPU_SUPPORT
ARM: crypto: use CC_FLAGS_FPU for NEON CFLAGS
ARM: implement ARCH_HAS_KERNEL_FPU_SUPPORT
arch: add ARCH_HAS_KERNEL_FPU_SUPPORT
x86/fpu: fix asm/fpu/types.h include guard
kbuild: enable -Wcast-function-type-strict unconditionally
kbuild: enable -Wformat-truncation on clang
...
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With the rework of how the __string() handles dynamic strings where it
saves off the source string in field in the helper structure[1], the
assignment of that value to the trace event field is stored in the helper
value and does not need to be passed in again.
This means that with:
__string(field, mystring)
Which use to be assigned with __assign_str(field, mystring), no longer
needs the second parameter and it is unused. With this, __assign_str()
will now only get a single parameter.
There's over 700 users of __assign_str() and because coccinelle does not
handle the TRACE_EVENT() macro I ended up using the following sed script:
git grep -l __assign_str | while read a ; do
sed -e 's/\(__assign_str([^,]*[^ ,]\) *,[^;]*/\1)/' $a > /tmp/test-file;
mv /tmp/test-file $a;
done
I then searched for __assign_str() that did not end with ';' as those
were multi line assignments that the sed script above would fail to catch.
Note, the same updates will need to be done for:
__assign_str_len()
__assign_rel_str()
__assign_rel_str_len()
I tested this with both an allmodconfig and an allyesconfig (build only for both).
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240222211442.634192653@goodmis.org/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240516133454.681ba6a0@rorschach.local.home
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@inria.fr>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Acked-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> for the amdgpu parts.
Acked-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com> #for
Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org> # for thermal
Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> # xfs
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
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Merge trivial x86 code generation annoyances
- Introduce helper macros for clang asm input problems
- use said macros to improve trivially stupid code generation issues in
bitops and array_index_mask_nospec
- also improve codegen with 32-bit array index comparisons
None of these really matter, but I look at code generation and profiles
fairly regularly, and these misfeatures caused the generated code to
look really odd and distract from the real issues.
* branch 'x86-codegen' of local tree:
x86: improve bitop code generation with clang
x86: improve array_index_mask_nospec() code generation
clang: work around asm input constraint problems
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This uses the new ASM_INPUT_RM macro to avoid the bad code generation
issue that clang has with more generic asm inputs.
This ends up avoiding generating code like this:
mov %r10,(%rsp)
tzcnt (%rsp),%rcx
which now becomes just
tzcnt %r10,%rcx
and in the process ends up also removing a few unnecessary stack frames
when the only use was that pointless "asm uses memory location off stack".
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Don't force the inputs to be 'unsigned long', when the comparison can
easily be done in 32-bit if that's more appropriate.
Note that while we can look at the inputs to choose an appropriate size
for the compare instruction, the output is fixed at 'unsigned long'.
That's not technically optimal either, since a 32-bit 'sbbl' would often
be sufficient.
But for the outgoing mask we don't know how the mask ends up being used
(ie we have uses that have an incoming 32-bit array index, but end up
using the mask for other things). That said, it only costs the extra
REX prefix to always generate the 64-bit mask.
[ A 'sbbl' also always technically generates a 64-bit mask, but with the
upper 32 bits clear: that's fine for when the incoming index that will
be masked is already 32-bit, but not if you use the mask to mask a
pointer afterwards, like the file table lookup does ]
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core
Pull driver core updates from Greg KH:
"Here is the small set of driver core and kernfs changes for 6.10-rc1.
Nothing major here at all, just a small set of changes for some driver
core apis, and minor fixups. Included in here are:
- sysfs_bin_attr_simple_read() helper added and used
- device_show_string() helper added and used
All usages of these were acked by the various maintainers. Also in
here are:
- kernfs minor cleanup
- removed unused functions
- typo fix in documentation
- pay attention to sysfs_create_link() failures in module.c finally
All of these have been in linux-next for a very long time with no
reported problems"
* tag 'driver-core-6.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core:
device property: Fix a typo in the description of device_get_child_node_count()
kernfs: mount: Remove unnecessary ‘NULL’ values from knparent
scsi: Use device_show_string() helper for sysfs attributes
platform/x86: Use device_show_string() helper for sysfs attributes
perf: Use device_show_string() helper for sysfs attributes
IB/qib: Use device_show_string() helper for sysfs attributes
hwmon: Use device_show_string() helper for sysfs attributes
driver core: Add device_show_string() helper for sysfs attributes
treewide: Use sysfs_bin_attr_simple_read() helper
sysfs: Add sysfs_bin_attr_simple_read() helper
module: don't ignore sysfs_create_link() failures
driver core: Remove unused platform_notify, platform_notify_remove
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Code in v6.9 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c was changed by commit
4db64279bc2b ("x86/cpu: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines") from:
static const struct x86_cpu_id intel_cod_cpu[] = {
X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(HASWELL_X, 0), /* COD */
X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(BROADWELL_X, 0), /* COD */
X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ANY, 1), /* SNC */ <--- 443
{}
};
static bool match_llc(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, struct cpuinfo_x86 *o)
{
const struct x86_cpu_id *id = x86_match_cpu(intel_cod_cpu);
to:
static const struct x86_cpu_id intel_cod_cpu[] = {
X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_HASWELL_X, 0), /* COD */
X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_BROADWELL_X, 0), /* COD */
X86_MATCH_VFM(INTEL_ANY, 1), /* SNC */
{}
};
static bool match_llc(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, struct cpuinfo_x86 *o)
{
const struct x86_cpu_id *id = x86_match_cpu(intel_cod_cpu);
On an Intel CPU with SNC enabled this code previously matched the rule on line
443 to avoid printing messages about insane cache configuration. The new code
did not match any rules.
Expanding the macros for the intel_cod_cpu[] array shows that the old is
equivalent to:
static const struct x86_cpu_id intel_cod_cpu[] = {
[0] = { .vendor = 0, .family = 6, .model = 0x3F, .steppings = 0, .feature = 0, .driver_data = 0 },
[1] = { .vendor = 0, .family = 6, .model = 0x4F, .steppings = 0, .feature = 0, .driver_data = 0 },
[2] = { .vendor = 0, .family = 6, .model = 0x00, .steppings = 0, .feature = 0, .driver_data = 1 },
[3] = { .vendor = 0, .family = 0, .model = 0x00, .steppings = 0, .feature = 0, .driver_data = 0 }
}
while the new code expands to:
static const struct x86_cpu_id intel_cod_cpu[] = {
[0] = { .vendor = 0, .family = 6, .model = 0x3F, .steppings = 0, .feature = 0, .driver_data = 0 },
[1] = { .vendor = 0, .family = 6, .model = 0x4F, .steppings = 0, .feature = 0, .driver_data = 0 },
[2] = { .vendor = 0, .family = 0, .model = 0x00, .steppings = 0, .feature = 0, .driver_data = 1 },
[3] = { .vendor = 0, .family = 0, .model = 0x00, .steppings = 0, .feature = 0, .driver_data = 0 }
}
Looking at the code for x86_match_cpu():
const struct x86_cpu_id *x86_match_cpu(const struct x86_cpu_id *match)
{
const struct x86_cpu_id *m;
struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
for (m = match;
m->vendor | m->family | m->model | m->steppings | m->feature;
m++) {
...
}
return NULL;
it is clear that there was no match because the ANY entry in the table (array
index 2) is now the loop termination condition (all of vendor, family, model,
steppings, and feature are zero).
So this code was working before because the "ANY" check was looking for any
Intel CPU in family 6. But fails now because the family is a wild card. So the
root cause is that x86_match_cpu() has never been able to match on a rule with
just X86_VENDOR_INTEL and all other fields set to wildcards.
Add a new flags field to struct x86_cpu_id that has a bit set to indicate that
this entry in the array is valid. Update X86_MATCH*() macros to set that bit.
Change the end-marker check in x86_match_cpu() to just check the flags field
for this bit.
Backporter notes: The commit in Fixes is really the one that is broken:
you can't have m->vendor as part of the loop termination conditional in
x86_match_cpu() because it can happen - as it has happened above
- that that whole conditional is 0 albeit vendor == 0 is a valid case
- X86_VENDOR_INTEL is 0.
However, the only case where the above happens is the SNC check added by
4db64279bc2b1 so you only need this fix if you have backported that
other commit
4db64279bc2b ("x86/cpu: Switch to new Intel CPU model defines")
Fixes: 644e9cbbe3fc ("Add driver auto probing for x86 features v4")
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable+noautosel@kernel.org> # see above
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240517144312.GBZkdtAOuJZCvxhFbJ@fat_crate.local
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